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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 In a smallish but pleasant office located in a nondescript, single-
story brick building on the north edge of RBS Industries’ chemical 
manufacturing plant, Kay Burde reviews specifications for changes to 
one of the plant’s production processes. Kay, a midlevel environmental 
manager for the firm, is particularly interested in the likely level of 
increased emissions and in why accountants in the plant’s corporate 
headquarters characterized those changes as capital expenditures. 
She is interested because these two factors, taken into account with 
several others, guide and constrain her judgment as to whether the 
changes will trigger additional regulatory obligations under the 
                                                                                                                    
 * Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. B.A., Villanova University, 1982; J.D., 
University of Pennsylvania, 1986. The author wishes to thank Steven Bank, Kirk Stark, 
Philip Tetlock, the participants in the symposium on the Behavioral Analysis of Legal In-
stitutions held at the Florida State University College of Law, and the UCLA School of 
Law Friday Faculty Workshop for their insightful comments. Also, many thanks to Vir-
ginia Boster for excellent research assistance. 
618  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:617 
 
Clean Air Act and will ultimately require her to notify the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) of the changes and the ensuing obli-
gations.  
 Up at the firm’s administration building, Bill Moogan, a tax at-
torney in the corporate counsel’s office, struggles through a close-out 
report regarding environmental clean-up activities at the plant. Initi-
ated last fiscal year, the cleanup involves three elements: the construc-
tion of a soil vapor extraction system to remove hazardous, volatile 
contaminants from the subsurface soil, excavation and off-site dis-
posal of tanks found buried at the plant, and installation of a 
groundwater “pump and treat” system designed to contain and ulti-
mately remove contaminants from the aquifer. The firm’s tax ac-
countants recommend deducting most of those clean-up costs cur-
rently. Moogan is concerned because several Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) pronouncements contend that the relevant regulations and case-
law require that a significant amount of those costs be capitalized. 
 Scenarios like these play out in businesses across the country 
every day in settings ranging from large industrial concerns such as 
chemical plants and refineries to small neighborhood enterprises 
such as dry cleaners and printers. The government relies heavily 
upon industry to monitor its own compliance with a wide range of 
health and safety and economic regulations and to disclose violations 
to the relevant regulatory agency. Given the astonishing number of 
businesses and regulations in play, it is difficult to imagine how a 
regulatory program of any significant size could function absent such 
reliance. Yet despite the apparent inevitability of self-reporting as a 
mainstay of enforcement policy, there is relatively little discussion 
regarding this form of mandatory disclosure in the relevant litera-
ture.1  
 This Article examines two questions regarding the use of disclo-
sure as an enforcement tool. First, what is it that regulators hope to 
accomplish by requiring or encouraging firms to report their compli-
                                                                                                                    
 1. There is, of course, significant literature regarding disclosure in the securities 
area. Much of that literature engages in debate over whether mandatory disclosure in the 
securities area is necessary or wise. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A 
Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 1028-34 (2000) (providing an overview of the 
debate). Some of the securities disclosure literature explores the failure of firm managers 
to disclose negative information where the information will likely become public at a later 
date, thus exposing the managers to reputational sanctions or legal liability. Commenta-
tors offer various persuasive accounts of why rational, good-faith managers would choose 
to ignore market pressures and legal obligations in such circumstances. See, e.g., Jennifer 
H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: Theory 
and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 724-27; Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers 
Fear a Good Thing Is Coming to an End: The Case of Interim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. 
REV. 675, 689-96 (1999); Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory 
of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 
U. PA. L. REV. 101, 144 (1997). 
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ance status to government agencies and to others? Second, consider-
ing what we know about human nature, how confident should we be 
that our current disclosure systems can achieve those objectives con-
sistently? These are, obviously, two very broad questions concerning 
a regulatory tool that takes many forms. Thus I cannot hope to an-
swer those two questions fully in this Article. Instead, the Article 
limits the inquiry to the context of one particular form of noncompli-
ance: strategic noncompliance.  
 Strategic noncompliance occurs when the firm acts in accordance 
with an interpretation of an ambiguous regulation that is contrary to 
the regulator’s stated interpretation. Obviously, the firm’s action is 
only a violation of law from the regulator’s perspective, at least until 
some final resolution of the question is reached by a court or through 
further legislative or administrative action clarifying the ambiguity. 
Thus even generally law-abiding individuals and firms can engage in 
strategic noncompliance without feeling that they are violating the 
law. In many cases, regulators are unaware of aggressive compliance 
positions taken by firms and are thus unable to challenge those posi-
tions without incurring significant costs. Mandatory disclosure ap-
pears to be a good fit for this problem because it can illuminate these 
shadowy areas of strategic noncompliance. In this Article, I aim to 
explore the extent to which mandatory disclosure can open the win-
dow to the interior of the firm and reduce the incidence of strategic 
noncompliance by good-faith actors.  
 Part II lays out a brief description of my operating assumptions 
for this Article. In Part III, I turn to an overview of the goals and 
structure of disclosure regimes. At one level, disclosure is obviously 
intended to redistribute information from within the firm to outside 
parties, such as government agencies, consumers, or local communi-
ties. However, regulators typically have deeper objectives in mind 
when adopting a disclosure regime than simply reallocating informa-
tion. In the case of enforcement, the major goals are to encourage the 
firm to regulate itself and to enable the regulator to take action 
against those firms that fail to self-regulate. These goals are pursued 
through three mechanisms of disclosure: the reflexive mechanism, 
the deterrent mechanism, and the enhancement mechanism. The re-
flexive mechanism, which operates even before disclosure occurs, 
forces the firm to look closely at its own behavior in hopes of eliciting 
a voluntary change in behavior. The deterrent mechanism, which 
also operates in the predisclosure stage, likewise attempts to change 
firm behavior directly, using the prospect of third-party reactions to 
the disclosure as the stick. The enhancement mechanism becomes ac-
tive after disclosure is complete. It focuses instead on the recipient, 
providing critical information to spur that party into taking some ac-
tion with respect to the firm.  
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 The remaining Parts of the Article examine how well two different 
types of disclosure implement these important mechanisms. The two 
types of disclosure—binary and fuzzy disclosure—differ in how they 
address the ambiguity found in virtually every regulation. Binary 
disclosure, on its face, simply ignores the ambiguity, treating the 
question of compliance as a rather straightforward, black-and-white 
proposition. Consequently, binary disclosure provisions typically lack 
any “built-in” reporting standard against which compliance is meas-
ured and instead only call for disclosure in instances in which the 
firm independently identifies noncompliance. Fuzzy disclosure rec-
ognizes the pervasive ambiguity and builds it into the reporting 
standards. Thus, a fuzzy disclosure provision may require the firm to 
report an act or transaction as a violation if the firm lacks a reason-
able basis or substantial authority for treating it as compliant. 
 The story is not especially favorable for either type of disclosure in 
terms of their likely capacity to fend off strategic noncompliance, al-
though binary disclosure fares far worse than fuzzy. Part IV of the 
Article identifies potentially powerful social, motivational, and cogni-
tive factors that can prod firm managers into engaging in strategic 
noncompliance. If activated, the reflexive and deterrent mechanisms 
of disclosure may offset these factors and cause the firm managers to 
adopt less aggressive interpretations of ambiguous regulations. How-
ever, absent an obvious violation, it is doubtful that binary disclosure 
would trigger these mechanisms. Because binary disclosure does not 
set out a reporting standard for evaluating compliance status, the 
firm will rely on the same standard in assessing compliance for pur-
poses of the disclosure provision as it did for evaluating compliance 
with the underlying substantive obligation. Thus the firm manager 
will be unlikely to conclude that disclosure is necessary.  
 Part V turns to fuzzy disclosure, demonstrating that it has greater 
potential to deal with strategic noncompliance than binary disclo-
sure. Assume that a fuzzy disclosure provision establishes a conser-
vative reporting standard for identifying noncompliance. In that 
case, a good-faith actor engaged in strategic noncompliance on the 
basis of an aggressive, arguably reasonable legal position may feel 
the normative obligation to disclose the position. Once that obligation 
is felt, a number of conscious and preconscious influences that sup-
port the reflexive, deterrent, and enhancement mechanisms may be 
triggered. Nonetheless, even fuzzy disclosure faces significant obsta-
cles to effective implementation. As I describe in Part VI, other coun-
tervailing cognitive, motivational, and social factors could prevent or 
impair the operation of the three disclosure mechanisms in the fuzzy 
disclosure context. 
 All this talk of the limitations of binary and fuzzy disclosure is not 
intended to undermine the value of disclosure as a regulatory tool. 
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Disclosure can be an effective instrument for regulators seeking to 
influence the behavior of law-abiding yet strategic firms and indi-
viduals. The reflexive mechanism of disclosure can reinforce their 
normative commitment to comply with the underlying substantive 
law. Likewise, their normative commitment to abide by disclosure ob-
ligations drives the deterrent and enhancement mechanisms, which 
bring external pressures to comply with the underlying substantive 
law. Yet if regulators hope to rely upon norms of “law-abidingness” in 
these ways, they must design their disclosure regimes more care-
fully. In particular, they must take into account the very ambiguity 
they seek to overcome and recognize the cognitive and social influ-
ences that affect the operation of those disclosure regimes. 
II.   AMBIGUITY, NORMS, AND STRATEGIC NONCOMPLIANCE 
 Before turning to the theory of mandatory disclosure in Part III, I 
want to identify and describe three assumptions that govern the dis-
cussion in the remainder of this Article. The first, I expect, is fairly 
noncontroversial: the law is ambiguous. The second is open to more 
debate: generally speaking, firm managers are law-abiding but stra-
tegic actors, or what I call “good-faith actors.” The third ties the first 
two together: under conditions of ambiguity, good-faith actors will 
engage in what I call “strategic noncompliance.”  
A.   Regulation and Ambiguity 
 Few readers will be shocked by the proposition that laws and 
regulations are ambiguous. Indeed, identifying and lambasting am-
biguity in the law has become a bit of a national pastime among crit-
ics of traditional regulation.2 Accordingly, I will spend little ink or 
time providing support for the claim. Suffice it to be said that envi-
ronmental laws and regulations can be quite complicated, often hav-
ing highly technical core requirements ringed with interlocking defi-
nitions and exceptions.3 For example, one court described analysis of 
the federal hazardous waste statute as “a mind-numbing journey.”4 
Yet as complex as environmental regulations (such as the Clean Air 
Act’s air toxics rules) can be, compared to the federal tax regulations 
they seem as sophisticated as Forrest Gump. One has only to spend a 
                                                                                                                    
 2. See Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of 
Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407, 2429-39 
(1995); David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of Ra-
tional Actor Models in Environmental Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 917, 931-36, 960 (2001) (sur-
veying the “complexity critique” of command-and-control regulation). 
 3. See Robert F. Blomquist, “Clean New World”: Toward an Intellectual History of 
American Environmental Law, 1961-1990, 25 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 4-9 (1990); Peter H. 
Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1 (1992). 
 4. See Am. Mining Cong. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1189 (1987). 
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bit of time working with the consolidated returns rules or partner-
ship regulations to appreciate the astounding intricacy of those pro-
grams.5 
 Of course, complexity is not synonymous with ambiguity;6 it is not 
even a necessary condition for ambiguity.7 Take the definition of 
“solid waste” under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act8 or 
the concept of “income” under the Internal Revenue Code.9 The fact 
is, though, that complexity often leads to ambiguity, as each word or 
concept added to a regulation to clarify it brings along the potential 
for additional alternative readings and unintended consequences. 
This notion lies at the core of Bayless Manning’s concept of “hyper-
lexis,” defined as ungoverned elaboration of regulations.10 Whether it 
arises from the vagueness of a single term (either on its face or as 
applied) or from the uncertainty generated from a complex system of 
rules, definitions, and exceptions, some amount of ambiguity appears 
inevitable and, thus, unsurprising.   
 What is surprising is how little attention is paid in the compliance 
literature to the strategic use of ambiguity by regulated entities, with 
the exception of the tax compliance literature.11 Many discussions of 
                                                                                                                    
 5. See James S. Eustice, Tax Complexity and the Tax Practitioner, 45 TAX L. REV. 7, 
7-9 (1989); Matthew B. Krasner, Continuation of the Affiliated Group Subsequent to a Divi-
sive Reorganization: A Patchwork of Inconsistent Rules with Uncertain Application, 41 
VAND. L. REV. 283 (1988). 
 6. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 2, at 2428-40 (defining complexity to include techni-
cality, indeterminacy, obscurity, and differentiation); Schuck, supra note 3, at 3 (defining 
complexity to include density, technicality, differentiation, and indeterminacy (or uncer-
tainty)). 
 7. Legal scholars have struggled to define the meaning and importance of ambiguity 
itself. See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 
66 (1983) (noting that commentators “differ considerably in both the relative significance 
they attach to formal rules and the attributes of rules with which they are most con-
cerned”). Diver focuses on the concept of precision, positing that it is a trade-off between 
three elements: transparency, accessibility, and congruence. Id. at 67. Lazarus refers to 
“indeterminate” rules, under which outcomes are often difficult to predict due to ambiguity 
in their language. Lazarus, supra note 2, at 2431. 
 8. Solid waste is defined as “any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment 
plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded 
material.” 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (2000). 
 9. See I.R.C. § 61(a) (2000) (defining gross income as “all income from whatever 
source derived”). 
 10. Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis and the Law of Conservation of Ambiguity: Thoughts 
on Section 385, 36 TAX LAW. 9, 12 (1982). Manning defined it more colorfully as “the patho-
logical social condition caused by an overactive law-making gland.” Bayless Manning, Hy-
perlexis: Our National Disease, 71 NW. U. L. REV. 767, 767 (1977); see also Robert Charles 
Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and Reform, 
87 YALE L.J. 90, 97-130 (1977) (tracking the evolution of Subchapter C as a series of stra-
tegic moves and countermoves by government and taxpayers). 
 11. See Paul J. Beck et al., Taxpayer Disclosure and Penalty Laws, 2 J. PUB. ECON. 
THEORY 243 (2000); Andrew D. Cuccia, The Economics of Tax Compliance: What Do We 
Know and Where Do We Go?, 13 J. ACCT. LITERATURE 81, 89 (1994) (surveying the tax lit-
erature on uncertainty in law). 
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compliance and enforcement assume that the difference between 
compliance and violation in any given situation is obvious.12 Others 
focus on violations of very simple rules and laws that have minimal 
ambiguity, such as running stop lights, shoplifting, fishing in prohib-
ited areas, and the like.13 Still others acknowledge ambiguity, but 
treat it solely as a barrier to compliance, suggesting that firms would 
comply if only someone would tell them what the rule “actually” is.14 
Undoubtedly, ambiguous rules can breed confusion among uniniti-
ated and inexperienced actors,15 but they also provide possibilities for 
the knowledgeable, strategic actor.16 I build upon that concept and 
import it into the study of mandatory disclosure more generally.   
B.   The Good-Faith, Strategic Actor 
 My second governing assumption is that firm actors attempt in 
good faith to comply with the law. Much of the traditional compliance 
literature assumed that individuals and firms are rational actors, 
driven solely or primarily by the desire to maximize profit.17 More re-
cently, many commentators and policymakers have rejected the 
dominance of the rational-actor stance, subscribing to the view that 
people comply with the law because of a widely held norm of law-
abidingness.18 There is significant empirical support for this notion of 
a “compliance norm” in a variety of settings, including business set-
tings.19 Rather than replacing economic rationality as an explanation 
                                                                                                                    
 12. Lauren B. Edelman et al., Legal Ambiguity and the Politics of Compliance: Af-
firmative Action Officers’ Dilemma, 13 LAW & POL’Y 73, 74 (1991) (“Much of the regulation 
literature treats law as a clear mandate to which organizations either comply or fail to 
comply.”). 
 13. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 41 (1990) (focusing on shoplifting, 
traffic violations, and drunk driving); K. Kuperan & Jon G. Sutinen, Blue Water Crime: De-
terrence, Legitimacy, and Compliance in Fisheries, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 309, 312 (1998) 
(examining violations of fishery regulations, in part because of their relative lack of ambi-
guity). 
 14. See Spence, supra note 2, at 977. 
 15. See JAMES K. HAMMITT & PETER REUTER, RAND. CORP., PUB. NO. R-3657-
EPA/JMO, MEASURING AND DETERRING ILLEGAL DISPOSAL OF HAZARDOUS WASTE: A 
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 7-9 (1988) (observing that noncompliance can be related to 
knowledge of regulations and technical expertise); John Brehm & James T. Hamilton, 
Noncompliance in Environmental Reporting: Are Violators Ignorant, or Evasive, of the 
Law?, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 444 (1996); Laura Langbein & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Implemen-
tation, Negotiation and Compliance in Environmental and Safety Regulation, 47 J. POL. 
854, 860 (1985). 
 16. See Richard G. Stoll, Coping with the RCRA Hazardous Waste System: A Few 
Practical Points for Fun and Profit, 1 ENVTL. HAZARDS 6, 6 (1989) (“In some situations, 
however, happy results and great cost savings can be achieved through a more careful 
reading of EPA’s regulations, an awareness of EPA’s rulings (often unpublished) and crea-
tive thinking.”). 
 17. Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 451, 
461-63 (2003). 
 18. Id. at 464-75. 
 19. Id. 
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(or predictor) of behavior, the compliance norm takes a place beside it 
as an additional factor influencing behavior.20  
 For purposes of this Article, I put consideration of economic ra-
tionality slightly off to the side (although not completely out of the 
picture). Instead, I aim to sharpen our understanding of what it 
means to follow the compliance norm. While my law-abiding actor 
experiences a strong normative drive to comply with the law,21 that 
drive is tempered by at least two other factors. First, the law-abiding 
actor balances the compliance norm against other norms that influ-
ence behavior, including organizational norms enforced within the 
firm.22 Second, within the broad constraint of following the law, the 
normative actor will behave strategically, searching for options that 
will advance his interests and anticipating likely reactions of other 
concerned parties. Combine these two factors in an environment of 
ambiguous regulation, and the result is what I call “strategic non-
compliance.” 
 Strategic noncompliance occurs where the firm acts in accordance 
with an interpretation of an ambiguous regulation that conflicts with 
the regulator’s interpretation.23 The concept of strategic noncompli-
                                                                                                                    
 20. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE 31 (1992); Malloy, supra note 17, at 456. Various scholars have be-
gun to develop theories as to how these two behavioral influences interact, although there 
is no clear consensus on the precise relationship between the two. See id. at 456 n.17. 
 21. Norms scholars in several disciplines continue to debate the underlying factors 
that drive norm compliance. For many law and norms scholars and others, the normative 
actor engages in an instrumental comparison of the costs and benefits of complying with a 
social norm. The detriments associated with transgressing a norm can include social and 
psychological sanctions, including disapproval by peers and feelings of embarrassment and 
guilt. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF OUR SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 106 
(1989) (“Alternatively, self-interest may act as a constraint on norms: I do X provided that 
the costs—the direct costs of doing X and the opportunity costs of not doing Y—are below a 
certain level.”); Christine Horne, Sociological Perspectives on the Emergence of Social 
Norms, in SOCIAL NORMS 3, 4 (Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp eds., 2001) (observing 
that “the majority of scholars emphasize the role of external sanctions”); Richard H. 
McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 340, 
378-81 (1997) (discussing the controversy over external social sanctions and internaliza-
tion). Others contend that norms have been “internalized” and thus operate without regard 
to external or internal sanctions. See JOHN FINLEY SCOTT, INTERNALIZATION OF NORMS: A 
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF MORAL COMMITMENT 1-4 (1971); Horne, supra, at 4 (defining in-
ternalization to include situations in which individuals “follow social norms because they 
want to”); Mark C. Suchman, On Beyond Interest: Rational, Normative and Cognitive Per-
spectives in the Social Scientific Study of Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 475, 480-82. 
 22. ELSTER, supra note 21, at 104; Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories 
of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1611 (2000). 
 23. Strategic noncompliance is commonly seen in the tax area. See Michael J. Graetz 
& Louis L. Wilde, The Economics of Tax Compliance: Fact and Fantasy, 38 NAT’L TAX J. 
355, 357 (1985) (characterizing “tax understatements from taking advantage of factual and 
legal uncertainties about the application of the substantive tax law” as noncompliance); 
Doreen McBarnet, The Construction of Compliance and the Challenge for Control: The 
Limits of Noncompliance Research, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 333, 341 (Joel Slemrod ed., 
1992) (“Law should be seen as a raw material to be worked on, and, in tax avoidance, what 
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ance acknowledges that in the case of ambiguous regulations, a firm’s 
compliance status is indeterminate, at least until some arbiter (such 
as a court) issues a final pronouncement. In some cases of strategic 
noncompliance, the firm’s reading of the regulation may be very well 
supported, while in others it may be simply a reasonable alternative 
or even a strained interpretation. Strategic noncompliance is concep-
tually distinct from “regulatory arbitrage,” a practice in which parties 
structure activity (such as business transactions or financial instru-
ments) so as to avoid the application of regulation or reduce its 
costs.24 In regulatory arbitrage, also known as “line-walking,” the 
regulation is relatively clear, and the party uses that clarity to ar-
range its affairs to stay just beyond the reach of the regulation.25 
Perhaps the best example of line-walking is the use of tax shelters, 
which take advantage of complications in the tax code and regula-
tions to create tax benefits that neither Congress nor the Treasury 
Department would have intended or desired.26 In practice, whether a 
firm is engaged in strategic noncompliance or regulatory arbitrage of-
ten depends on one’s judgment as to whether the regulation in ques-
tion is ambiguous or not.27    
                                                                                                                    
we are seeing is tax practitioners working on the law to . . . create legal advantages for 
their clients that were not necessarily intended.” (footnote omitted)). It also occurs in the 
environmental area. For example, in the late 1990s, the EPA entered into a series of con-
sent decrees with a group of diesel truck manufacturers settling claims under the Clean 
Air Act involving allegations that the defendants equipped their trucks with “defeat de-
vices.” Defeat devices are designed to control various functions within the engine such that 
the engine automatically operates in one mode while undergoing federally required emis-
sions testing and operates in another, more highly polluting mode in actual use on the 
highway. Naftali Bendavid, Penalty for Truck Pollution: $1 Billion, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 23, 
1998, at 4. The manufacturers contended that it was not their fault that the EPA’s emis-
sion tests did “not capture the full effect of trucks cruising at highway speeds.” John H. 
Cushman Jr., Makers of Diesel Truck Engines Are Under Pollution Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 11, 1998, at A16.   
 24. See Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 
22 J. CORP. L. 211, 227 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 
995 (1995) (“Because rules have clear edges, they allow people to ‘evade’ them by engaging 
in conduct that is technically exempted but that creates the same or analogous harms.”). 
 25. Edward D. Kleinbard, Corporate Tax Shelters and Corporate Tax Management, 
1999 TAX EXECUTIVE 235, 241 (describing line-walking as a practice in which “taxpayers go 
to the edge of whatever activity is permitted by formal rules,” which is viewed by Treasury 
officials as “troublesome”). 
 26. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 41 (1987) (describing 
how sophisticated syndicates of physicians formed a cattle-feeding shelter to take advan-
tage of a provision allowing farmers to immediately “deduct feed costs . . . on the theory 
that it would simplify bookkeeping for financially unsophisticated operators”); see also 
Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation and the Vulnerability 
of a Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 398 (1989) (noting a similar problem of 
line-walking with respect to international regulation of new generations of financial prod-
ucts such as the interest rate swap and the currency swap).  
 27. That judgment can have great significance in the context of an enforcement action 
in which the court will defer to the regulator’s reading of an ambiguous regulation but not 
to its interpretation of a “clear” regulation. In those circumstances, strategic noncompli-
ance will often be converted into a judgment of liability, while regulatory arbitrage may 
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 The key to the relationship between the compliance norm and 
strategic noncompliance lies in the fact that in most cases regulations 
are neither perfectly clear nor hopelessly indeterminate. It helps to 
think of regulations as having a range of potential interpretations of 
varying degrees of reasonableness, rather than one “true” interpreta-
tion or an infinite set of possible meanings.28 At either end of the 
range, the interpretations begin to become more and more unreason-
able, eventually reaching the point at which they are frivolous. One 
can accept the inherent ambiguity and open texture of rules yet still 
recognize that even complex and vague rule language can have a 
widely accepted, finite set of potential meanings. Within the discrete 
communities affected by or working with the rule, there is likely to be 
a sense of general agreement as to the relative reasonableness of 
various alternative interpretations: some of those alternatives will 
fall within the zone of reasonableness and others will not.29 Strategic 
noncompliance occurs where the regulator chooses one interpreta-
tion, and the firm manager selects another within that zone of rea-
sonableness.  
 One might argue that strategic noncompliance of this sort is not 
objectionable. To a certain extent, our legal system encourages, or at 
least tolerates, efforts by citizens to make the most of opportunities 
present in regulations and laws for minimizing the impact of the law 
on business or personal activities30 and to question or challenge agen-
                                                                                                                    
emerge with the court’s (sometimes grudging) blessing.  
 28. Of course, some language may have a smaller range of potential meanings due to 
the use of words or terms with generally accepted meanings. For example, a rule that pro-
vides that no person may pilot a commercial airliner after his sixtieth birthday has a much 
narrower range of meanings than one that prohibits flying where the person “poses an un-
reasonable risk of an accident.” Diver, supra note 7, at 69. Diver referred to this quality as 
the “transparency” of the rule. Id. at 67. 
 29. See id. at 67 n.14 (“I assume, at a minimum, that the addressees of most adminis-
trative rules are a ‘community’ whose shared experiences or values can give objective (if 
not wholly deterministic) meaning to such texts.”); Sunstein, supra note 24, at 990 (“Al-
most all real-world cases involving the meaning of rules are very easy. Although they are 
contestable, the ex post substantive judgments that underlie readings of rules are often 
widely shared . . . .”). For some rules, that meaning is borne of general practice, custom, 
and socialization and embedded in mental models shared by members of the relevant pro-
fessions. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers’ 
Heads, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1498, 1516-21 (1996) (discussing the development of mental 
models of the law among practitioners and judges who interact on a regular basis); Doreen 
McBarnet & Christopher Whelan, The Elusive Spirit of the Law: Formalism and the 
Struggle for Legal Control, 54 MOD. L. REV. 848, 872-73 (1991) (discussing “working cer-
tainty” that can sometimes be achieved). Of course, there may be disagreement as to the 
relative reasonableness of those alternatives within the zone, as well as to the reasonable-
ness of some interpretations at the margins. 
 30. Judge Learned Hand’s perspective on tax planning, for instance, is well known to 
most tax lawyers and law students taking the basic tax course: “Any one may so arrange 
his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern 
which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.” 
Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff’d, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). Almost 
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cies’ interpretations of statutes and regulations.31 The enforcement 
process could thus be viewed as a vehicle by which ambiguities and 
good-faith disagreements about the meaning of the law are re-
solved.32 Enforcement is thus viewed as part of rulemaking, in which 
content is determined by a judge or by the parties in negotiation. 
 In a world of perfect information and zero transaction costs, such 
an argument might well have traction. In the actual world of regula-
tion, however, reliance on standard enforcement practices such as in-
spections and fines is a dubious proposition. This is so because stra-
tegic noncompliance often occurs deep in the belly of the firm and is 
often invisible to the regulatory agency.33 Absent meaningful disclo-
sure, an internal firm determination concluding that a process 
change falls within an exception or that a waste product is not sub-
ject to regulation will never be submitted to or reviewed by a regula-
tor. Such determinations often require extensive knowledge of facility 
operations and access to numerous and diverse documents and per-
sonnel. The costs to the government of identifying and obtaining that 
information to conduct its own evaluations would be prohibitive. 
Consequently, unless the regulator implements some workable form 
of disclosure, many acts of strategic noncompliance can remain in the 
shadows, and as a practical matter, the underlying ambiguities are 
resolved in favor of the firm. This brings us back to the questions this 
Article attempts to address: Do disclosure mechanisms shine a light 
on strategic noncompliance, and if so, to what effect? 
                                                                                                                    
seventy years later, Hand’s pronouncement continues to influence courts in their analysis 
of tax planning activities. See, e.g., Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Comm’r, 254 F.3d 1313, 1316 
(11th Cir. 2001); IES Indus., Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 354-55 (8th Cir. 2001). 
For a criticism of the conventional view that taxpayers have a “right” to engage in tax 
planning, see David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 220-
22 (2002). 
 31. The federal Administrative Procedure Act and many federal laws recognize the 
right of interested parties to seek judicial review of newly promulgated regulations. See, 
e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2000); Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6976 (2000). 
 32. See Bridget M. Hutter, Controlling Workplace Deviance: State Regulation of Occu-
pational Health and Safety, in DEVIANCE IN THE WORKPLACE 191, 202-04 (Ida Harper 
Simpson & Richard L. Simpson eds., 1999) (describing compliance as a process which in-
cludes enforcement and negotiation as tools to clarify vague or ambiguous rules); JOSEPH 
F. DIMENTO, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND AMERICAN BUSINESS: DILEMMAS OF COMPLIANCE 
25-28 (1986) (discussing compliance as a process of interpretation). 
 33. See McBarnet, supra note 23, at 340.  
If challenged they might fail; the enforcers’ definition of the meaning or appli-
cability of legal rules might prevail. But one point of the strategy was that the 
transaction, in its endorsed-by-lawyers form, could be treated by the taxpayer 
as not taxable. It might, therefore, be not declared at all, or not in a recogniza-
bly taxable form. The revenue department might never have the opportunity to 
challenge. 
Id. 
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III.   MANDATORY DISCLOSURE: THE BACK STORY 
 This Part provides a bit of background on disclosure as a regula-
tory tool. It examines the goals and operation of typical mandatory 
disclosure systems and identifies three common mechanisms of most 
systems. The Part concludes with an introduction to two different 
forms of disclosure: binary and fuzzy. 
A.   Types of Mandatory Disclosure 
 Legislators and government agencies use various forms of manda-
tory disclosure to regulate a wide assortment of activities, including 
securities transactions, corporate governance, provision of health 
care, emission of pollutants, payment of taxes, and so on. In this Ar-
ticle, I focus on “complementary disclosure,” meaning disclosure used 
to directly support the enforcement of other substantive regulations. 
Thus, when I receive a payment from a third party, various substan-
tive provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) may characterize 
that payment as income and subject me to tax. Other provisions of 
the IRC require me (and, in some cases, the payor) to disclose infor-
mation about the payment to the government. These two sets of pro-
visions work together to ensure that revenue is collected.34   
 The other two types of disclosure—primary and supplemental—
receive much more attention in the literature. Disclosure is “pri-
mary” where it is the dominant regulatory tool used to implement a 
policy goal or goals. For example, federal regulation of the issuance of 
publicly traded securities relies upon primary disclosure. It requires 
that firms disseminate specified information about the securities and 
the issuer to potential purchasers and to the market generally.35 
Supplemental disclosure augments the goals of existing substantive 
rules without assisting in their enforcement. For example, under the 
Clean Air Act’s air toxics program, the EPA sets emission limits for a 
set of chemicals known as “hazardous air pollutants,” or “HAPs.”36 
Separately, the EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) program re-
quires firms to disclose the volume and nature of discharges of speci-
fied pollutants (including many HAPs) on an annual basis.37 While 
both programs seek to reduce emissions of HAPs and thus supple-
                                                                                                                    
 34. See I.R.C. § 6051(a), (d) (2000) (requiring businesses to report to the government 
wages paid to employees). 
 35. Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. 
REV. 763, 764 (1995); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its 
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 418 (2003); Cynthia A. Wil-
liams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1207-09 (1999). 
 36. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (2000). 
 37. Id. 
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ment each other’s efforts, they do so by employing largely unrelated 
mechanisms.  
 All three forms of disclosure are obviously intended to address 
some type of information deficit. Typically, that deficit occurs be-
cause the regulated firm has information regarding its operations not 
otherwise available to the government or some relevant third party.38 
For example, in the RBS Industries scenerio,39 Kay Burde has pri-
vate information regarding the nature of the process changes, infor-
mation that the government would like to acquire. In the securities 
context, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s disclosure rules 
for the issuance of securities seek to minimize the disparity of infor-
mation between firm managers and the public market.40 
 While curing information disparities is a central part of manda-
tory disclosure, it is not an end in itself. Rather, regulators view the 
information asymmetries as barriers that prevent the firm from 
adopting the behavior desired by the regulator.41 To that end, most 
disclosure regimes exhibit a similar structure, set out in Figure 1, in 
which a sequence of four steps leads from the initial state of informa-
tion asymmetry to the regulator’s ultimate goal.42 First, the firm is 
required to engage in the collection and processing of private infor-
mation. This processing may involve anything from simple tabulation 
of the data to sophisticated legal, factual, and scientific analysis and 
evaluation. Thereafter, the processed information is disclosed to the 
relevant recipients. (In the case of complementary disclosure, the re-
cipients are primarily government regulators, although environ-
mental and community groups and the media may also ultimately 
obtain the information.) In the next step, the recipients themselves 
process the information and determine whether to take action—
including enforcement actions or publicity campaigns—in light of it. 
Lastly, assuming the recipient does take some effective action in re-
sponse to the disclosure, the firm may modify its behavior accord-
ingly. 
 
                                                                                                                    
 38. But the information deficit addressed by mandatory disclosure may also be found 
inside the regulated firm. In some cases, certain individuals or organizational units within 
the firm may have access to information needed by others within the firm. Thus, some 
mandatory disclosure programs require the firm to have a system in place for the collection 
and reporting of internal information to firm managers to be used by those managers for 
their own use or for preparing external disclosures. 
 39. See supra Part I. 
 40. See Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You 
Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1335-37 (1996); Kitch, supra note 35, 
at 773-76. 
 41. See Paredes, supra note 35, at 418. 
 42. This figure is based on a flowchart in DAVID WEIL, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF 
TRANSPARENCY: A MODEL OF DISCLOSURE BASED REGULATION 34 (Boston Univ. Sch. of 
Mgmt., Working Paper No. 2004-12, 2004). 
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FIGURE 1 
MANDATORY DISCLOSURE: 
FORM AND FUNCTION 
 
As the flowchart in Figure 1 illustrates, the ultimate goal of a 
complementary disclosure regime is to alter the behavior of the firm. 
Such disclosure regimes tend to rely on three mechanisms or func-
tions, either separately or in combination, to influence firm behavior: 
the reflexive mechanism, the deterrent mechanism, and the en-
hancement mechanism. As indicated in Figure 1, they operate at 
various stages of the disclosure process.43 Because I use these three 
mechanisms as a basis for evaluating different forms of disclosure in 
Parts IV and V, it is helpful to have an understanding of each. 
                                                                                                                    
 43. Of course, various types of disclosure programs may have a wide variety of goals 
and functions beyond those I discuss here. See, e.g., WEIL, supra note 42, at 3-6 (identifying 
allocative efficiency, equity, civic engagement, and performance improvement); Paul G. 
Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 
1048 (1995) (designed to overcome agency problems); William M. Sage, Regulating 
Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701 
(1999) (describing five rationales for disclosure in the health care industry, including com-
petition, productivity, and democracy rationales). 
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1.   Information and the Reflexive Mechanism 
The reflexive mechanism focuses on information asymmetries 
within the firm that impair the firm’s ability to identify and respond 
to important issues. Where the firm’s information collection, process-
ing, or communication routines are flawed, information that should 
be flowing to other firm departments can end up in a “traffic jam” or 
a dead end. Consider the role of corporate directors in ensuring that 
the firm operates in compliance with the law. The information re-
quired to determine whether an oil refinery is violating a specific en-
vironmental regulation may be dispersed among two or more indi-
viduals or units within the firm. Absent some mechanism that coor-
dinates the collection and processing of that information, the firm 
will be unable to assess its compliance status and, if necessary, alter 
its internal operating routines to improve environmental perform-
ance. Even among firms with a sincere desire to comply with or even 
exceed the substantive regulatory requirements, organizational iner-
tia flowing from flawed operating procedures, inadequate resources, 
opportunistic managers, or other factors can stand in the way of de-
veloping such a mechanism.44 
A legal obligation to collect, process, and disclose information to 
parties within the firm or outside of it can encourage the firm to be-
come more aware of its own internal structure and operations and 
perhaps even self-critical of its performance. This is the reflexive 
mechanism of disclosure. As described by Eric Orts, reflexive regula-
tion encourages “internal self-critical reflection” within organizations 
and institutions concerning the nature and consequences of their ac-
tivities.45 The engine driving reflexive regulation is process; that is, 
the development of mandatory procedures that by their nature force 
the firm to confront the substantive issues of concern to the regulator 
in a systematic way.46 
One can see reflexive systems in operation in a variety of circum-
stances. For example, the United States Sentencing Guidelines for 
business organizations provide firms with a strong incentive to im-
plement internal compliance-monitoring programs.47 A firm facing 
criminal penalties can obtain a significant penalty reduction if it had 
in place a bona fide compliance system meeting certain general crite-
ria.48 Likewise, under Delaware corporate law, as interpreted in the 
                                                                                                                    
 44. Malloy, supra note 17, at 484-91.  
 45. Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1254-55 
(1995). 
 46. Malloy, supra note 17, at 495. 
 47. Orts, supra note 45, at 1281-82. 
 48. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (2004). The U.S. Sentencing 
Commission was established under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. See id. § 1A2. The 
Commission issued sentencing guidelines effective in 1987 for individuals, followed by 
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Caremark decision, directors have a duty to employ an internal re-
porting system aimed at channeling information about the firm’s 
compliance status to senior management and the board.49 In the tax 
area, Congress adopted a reflexive approach in section 6662(e) of the 
Internal Revenue Code,50 which provides for relief from penalties im-
posed on a firm that understates the value of certain transactions 
with affiliated companies where the firm develops and maintains 
contemporaneous documentation supporting the determination and 
reasonableness of its transfer prices.  
 There is significant controversy over whether various forms of 
monitoring and disclosure systems actually achieve their reflexive 
goals. Many scholars are skeptical, noting the lack of evidence sup-
porting the efficacy of such programs or relying on economic analysis 
or social science research to identify likely barriers to successful im-
plementation.51 However, there is at least some evidence that in some 
circumstances, such programs have caused firms to critically exam-
ine their internal policies.52 For example, in an evaluation of the sec-
tion 6662(e) penalty reduction program based on a survey of 696 tax-
payers and on-site examinations of twenty-five multinational corpo-
rations, the Internal Revenue Service concluded, “the preparation of 
contemporaneous documentation leads taxpayers to perform more 
                                                                                                                    
amendments effective in 1991 that cover sentences for organizations. See id. The guide-
lines set forth seven general criteria that must be met in order to obtain a sentencing re-
duction, including establishing standards and procedures reasonably capable of reducing 
the prospect of criminal conduct, appointing a high-level compliance officer, training em-
ployees, using monitoring and auditing systems to assure adherence to the program, and 
modifying the program when noncompliance is identified. See id. §§ 8B2.1(b)(1)-(7). In a re-
cent decision, the United States Supreme Court held the mandatory nature of the sentenc-
ing guidelines rendered them unconstitutional. United States v. Booker, 123 S. Ct. 738 
(2005). 
 49. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996). It is 
important to note that Caremark requires only good-faith efforts to meet the duty. Id. Con-
ceivably, directors acting in good faith could nonetheless establish a minimal or flawed sys-
tem, yet still meet the duty to monitor, particularly where they relied upon trusted, quali-
fied corporate staff or outside experts to design the system.  
 50. I.R.C. § 6662(e)(3)(B) (2000). 
 51. See RICHARD S. GRUNER, CORPORATE CRIME AND SENTENCING 867-83 (1994); Kim-
berly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 
WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 510-15 (2003); William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, 
and the Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1407-10 (1999) (suggesting that 
corporate monitoring and compliance systems can be used to create a false image of “good 
corporate citizenship” and to reduce the likelihood of criminal prosecution and the severity 
of penalties). 
 52. See John R. Steer, Changing Organizational Behavior—The Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines Experiment Begins to Bear Fruit, in 1 CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 2002, at 113, 
116-17 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B-1317, 2002); see 
also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 
6662(e) (2001) [hereinafter SECTION 6662 STUDY]. 
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comprehensive up-front analysis of transfer prices, and thereby re-
duces the number of disputes in this area.”53  
 Clearly, whether a particular program will serve the reflexive 
mechanism depends on a variety of contextual factors, including the 
specific design of the program and the nature of the firms regu-
lated.54 I propose no resolution of this question here, even assuming 
that it is capable of resolution, but do offer this point for considera-
tion. In thinking about the reflexive mechanism, it is useful to dis-
tinguish between two causes of noncompliance. Where noncompli-
ance flows primarily from structural features of the firm such as 
poorly designed communication and coordination channels between 
organizational units, process-oriented regulation may be quite suc-
cessful in facilitating review-and-adjustment internal operating pro-
cedures.55 However, where violations result from the choice to play 
the audit lottery or to engage in strategic noncompliance, process-
oriented regulation is likely to be less successful and may be utilized 
as a defensive tool to protect the firm.56 I develop this point in more 
detail below.57  
2.   Response and the Enhancement Mechanism 
 This mechanism of disclosure focuses more directly on how man-
datory disclosure affects the behavior of the recipient of information. 
The enhancement mechanism is premised upon the assumption that 
access to more accurate or better-quality information will enhance 
the behavior of the recipient. The securities field provides a useful 
and (depending upon your perspective) persuasive demonstration of 
the enhancement mechanism. First, based on the assumption that 
well-informed investors can protect themselves by “voting with their 
feet,” our securities laws require the production of an enormous 
amount of internal information aimed at providing investors with an 
adequate basis for judging the value of the offered securities. On a 
related note, comprehensive disclosure also purportedly improves the 
                                                                                                                    
 53. SECTION 6662 STUDY, supra note 52, at 7. 
 54. For example, has firm management embraced an incentive structure that encour-
ages self-reflective behavior among employees?  
 55. See Malloy, supra note 17, at 494-95. 
 56. See id. at 524; Orts, supra note 45, at 1283-84. 
 57. See infra Part IV.C. One last note concerning the reflexive function is that at the 
individual level it may serve a second, related purpose by creating a sense of accountabil-
ity. Psychologists define accountability as the expectation that one’s decisions and actions 
will be subject to scrutiny by others. Philip E. Tetlock, The Impact of Accountability on 
Judgment and Choice: Toward a Social Contingency Model, in 25 ADVANCES IN 
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 331, 337 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1992). In a series of ex-
perimental laboratory studies, researchers have explored the behavioral responses of indi-
viduals under conditions of accountability. I address this point in more detail in the discus-
sion of the reflexive function in binary disclosure. See infra Part IV.D.  
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market’s ability to set prices.58 Second, disclosure promotes share-
holder empowerment by providing shareholders with the information 
needed to exercise their franchise rights and, when necessary, to 
pursue litigation against the firm or its managers and directors.59 
While there is still debate about the actual value of the enhancement 
mechanism in the securities area,60 there is little question that fed-
eral legislators and regulators see it as the dominant strategy.61  
 Disclosure regimes relying upon the enhancement mechanism are 
widely used.62 However, apart from the emerging literature on tax 
shelter disclosures,63 most discussion of the enhancement mechanism 
focuses on private-party recipients, such as local communities, cus-
tomers, stockholders, and nongovernmental organizations.64 Gener-
ally speaking, disclosure for private-party consumption strives to 
bring market forces and public opinion to bear on firm decisionmak-
ing, thus altering firm behavior without the need for direct, coercive 
government action.65 Yet, information disclosure can also improve the 
government regulator’s operations in at least two ways. First, assum-
ing that the regulator receives accurate and complete information 
about firm practices, it can adjust its enforcement activities so as to 
identify and pursue violations at one plant or within an entire indus-
try sector that otherwise would be difficult to detect.66 Second, the 
                                                                                                                    
 58. See Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock 
Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 979 (1992); Kitch, supra note 35, at 764-65; Paredes, supra note 
35, at 418. For an overview and critique of the efficient capital market hypothesis, see 
Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market 
Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613 (1988). 
 59. See Mahoney, supra note 43, at 1051-52. 
 60. For a concise overview of the historical and current debates, see Paredes, supra 
note 35. 
 61. Id. at 421-30. 
 62. See, e.g., Tom Tietenberg, Disclosure Strategies for Pollution Control, in THE 
MARKET AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MARKET-BASED POLICY 
INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL REFORM 14 (Thomas Sterner ed., 1999); WEIL, supra 
note 42, at 1-2. 
 63. See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH. CONG., STUDY OF PRESENT-
LAW PENALTY AND INTEREST PROVISIONS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 3801 OF THE INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERVICE RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998 (INCLUDING PROVISIONS 
RELATING TO CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS) 157 (Comm. Print 1999) [hereinafter PENALTY 
PROVISIONS]; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS: 
DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 36-39 (1999); Symposium on Corpo-
rate Tax Shelters Part I, 55 TAX L. REV. 125 (2002); Symposium on Corporate Tax Shelters 
Part II, 55 TAX L. REV. 289 (2002). 
 64. See, e.g., Tietenberg, supra note 62, at 18-23; Paul R. Kleindorfer & Eric W. Orts, 
Informational Regulation of Environmental Risks, 18 RISK ANALYSIS 155, 160 (1998); Wil-
liams, supra note 35, at 1277-84 (arguing that the Securities and Exchange Commission 
has the legal authority to require disclosure of compliance information for the benefit of in-
vestors). 
 65. Tietenberg, supra note 62, at 15; Mark A. Cohen, Information as a Policy Instru-
ment in Protecting the Environment: What Have We Learned?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & 
ANALYSIS 10425, 10425-26 (2001); Kleindorfer & Orts, supra note 64, at 156-59. 
 66. Professor Pearlman characterizes this as the “audit” function. Ronald A. 
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regulator may use the information to identify flaws or ambiguities in 
the underlying regulations and attempt to correct such problems by 
modifying the rules or issuing informal guidance.67 
 The strength of the enhancement mechanism is subject to two im-
portant limitations. First, the firm must provide relevant, usable in-
formation in response to the disclosure obligation. Second, the recipi-
ent must have the resources needed to process and use the informa-
tion in a meaningful way. There is a growing literature that exam-
ines the latter,68 and I will not address that point further. However, 
there is surprisingly little discussion, particularly in the environ-
mental literature, of whether we may reasonably assume that firms 
will actually comply with mandatory disclosure obligations. Parts IV 
and V consider that question at length.  
3.   Disclosure and the Deterrence Mechanism 
 The deterrence mechanism essentially acts as a bridge between 
the other two mechanisms. Recall that the reflexive mechanism 
causes the firm to look inward and engage in a critical, realistic as-
sessment of its own behavior. The enhancement mechanism seeks to 
alter the information recipient’s behavior and thus bring external 
pressure to bear on the firm. In the deterrence mechanism, the firm 
anticipates the reaction of information recipients and alters its con-
duct so as to avoid that reaction.69  
 The deterrence mechanism thus fits neatly within classic rational 
choice theories of enforcement in which individuals are viewed as ra-
tional actors seeking to maximize satisfaction of their preferences.70 
                                                                                                                    
Pearlman, Demystifying Disclosure: First Steps, 55 TAX L. REV. 289, 294 (2002). Access to 
such information can have impacts beyond simply better enforcement at individual plants. 
For example, by aggregating the individual disclosures of many plants, the agency is able 
to identify general trends of noncompliance within an industry sector that can be ad-
dressed at that level through a broad-based enforcement initiative or through negotiations 
with relevant industry associations. 
 67. In the tax context, Professor Pearlman calls this the “tax policy function.” Id. at 
304.  
 68. Troy A. Paredes, Foreword to Symposium, After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Fu-
ture of Mandatory Disclosure System, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 229, 237-38. 
 69. Pearlman, supra note 66, at 305 (“If taxpayers realize that the Service will know 
of the existence of tax shelters in which they participate and, accordingly, will be more 
likely to audit the transactions, they may be more reluctant to engage in certain transac-
tions in the first place.”). 
 70. See Scott, supra note 22, at 1613 n.22 (citing HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 112-20 (3d ed. 1992), to describe rational choice theory); see also 2 HERBERT A. 
SIMON, Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral Science, in MODELS OF 
BOUNDED RATIONALITY: BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 287, 291 
(1982) (describing rational choice as decisionmaking intended to maximize the expected 
utility of the outcome to the individual, given that individual’s preferences). As with most 
theories, rational choice theory comes in many forms and versions. See Timothy F. Malloy, 
Regulating by Incentives: Myths, Models, and Micromarkets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 531, 533 n.9 
(2002). For a useful and cogent discussion of subjective expected utility theory, the most 
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In the case of the business firm, the dominant preference is profit 
maximization or some other measure of financial success.71 In decid-
ing whether to engage in a particular activity—be it using a tax shel-
ter mechanism to avoid taxes, generating emissions of a toxic chemi-
cal, or using unconventional accounting methods—the firm will 
weigh the relative costs and benefits of that action. One of the poten-
tial costs of the action is “third-party costs”: the reaction of third par-
ties such as a regulator seeking penalties, the securities market ad-
justing share price, or an individual shareholder bringing a lawsuit. 
The firm will take the action so long as the benefits flowing to it ex-
ceed the costs, including third-party costs. Absent a disclosure re-
gime, the relevant third parties may never discover the firm’s action, 
and accordingly the third-party costs are discounted to reflect the low 
probability of detection.72 Mandatory disclosure increases the deter-
rent value of third-party costs by increasing the probability of detec-
tion, assuming, of course, that the firm actually makes the disclo-
sure.  
B.   Binary and Fuzzy Disclosure 
 Thus far, I have sketched a fairly broad conceptual framework re-
garding the goals and structure of disclosure regimes. But what do 
complementary disclosure provisions—those designed to improve 
compliance with separate, substantive regulations—actually look like 
on the ground? Of course, they vary along a number of dimensions. 
For example, some impose an explicit obligation to report the firm’s 
compliance status, while others simply provide “rewards” for volun-
tary disclosure.73 Some require that the firm disclose violations im-
mediately or in short order, while others mandate disclosure of non-
compliance on an annual or other periodic basis.74 Given my focus on 
the effects of ambiguity on disclosure, one other dimension of differ-
ence assumes particular prominence, namely the extent to which the 
                                                                                                                    
widely used version of rational choice theory, see Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some 
Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 750 
(1990). 
 71. See DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 724-29 (1990) (ex-
plaining the rational choice assumption of profit maximization and describing criticisms 
within economics of that assumption); Herbert A. Simon, Theories of Decision-Making in 
Economics and Behavioral Science, 49 AM. ECON. REV. 253, 262 (1959). 
 72. Spence, supra note 2, at 920-21. In some instances, the nondisclosed information 
will in due course come to light anyway; thus, the probability of detection is quite high. 
 73. For example, the EPA provides penalty relief to firms that self-audit and self-
report. Jay P. Kesan, Encouraging Firms to Police Themselves: Strategic Prescriptions to 
Promote Corporate Self-Auditing, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV 155, 156. 
 74. The NSPS notification is required within a short time before the modification is 
implemented. Conversely, the Clean Air Act’s operating permit program for major sources 
calls for periodic disclosure of noncompliance, usually annually or semiannually. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7414(a) (2000). 
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disclosure mechanism acknowledges the ambiguity of the underlying 
substantive rule. In other words, does the disclosure provision view 
compliance status as a black-or-white state of affairs (binary view) 
or, instead, as a gray relationship between an indeterminate stan-
dard and an uncertain factual situation (fuzzy view)?75 This Part uses 
the two hypothetical scenarios concerning RBS Industries introduced 
at the start of this Article to highlight the distinction between the bi-
nary and the fuzzy view.  
1.   Binary Disclosure Under the Clean Air Act 
 When we last met Kay Burde, she was reviewing information re-
garding changes to one of the older process lines at the RBS Indus-
tries plant. During a maintenance turnaround at the plant, the engi-
neering department replaced some of the original pumps and piping 
with equipment having a larger design capacity. The new pumps and 
piping increased the efficiency of the unit, allowing it to generate 
more product in the same amount of time. Burde is concerned be-
cause the increased production rate results in slightly higher air 
emissions, which could mean that the air pollution control require-
ments under the federal “New Source Performance Standards,” or 
NSPS program, now apply to the plant.  
 The Clean Air Act’s NSPS program seeks to preserve and improve 
air quality in the face of increasing industrial expansion. It does so 
by requiring that new sources of pollutants in certain industrial or 
commercial sectors achieve standards of emission control set out in 
EPA regulations. Thus, if a glass manufacturer were to construct a 
new steam-generating industrial boiler, it must ensure that its emis-
sions of carbon monoxide, oxides of nitrogen, and other pollutants 
stay below the specified level. The regulations also apply to existing 
equipment that undergoes a “modification”;76 and that is the root of 
Burde’s concerns. 
                                                                                                                    
 75. “Fuzzy” theory posits that all things are a matter of degree. BART KOSKO, NEURAL 
NETWORKS AND FUZZY SYSTEMS: A DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS APPROACH TO MACHINE 
INTELLIGENCE 3 (1992). Thus, rather than being “in compliance” or “out of compliance,” a 
firm would exhibit a greater or lesser degree of compliance. See id. at 33 (explaining that a 
“fuzzy” judge decides a case by applying vague legal principles to uncertain facts); 
MICHAEL SMITHSON, IGNORANCE AND UNCERTAINTY: EMERGING PARADIGMS 108-18 (1989). 
 76. If limited to “new” sources only, the NSPS program would create an incentive for 
cost-conscious companies to maintain older, unregulated equipment for as long as possible, 
in many cases by making life-extending or capacity-expanding changes and upgrades to 
the older equipment. Retention of these upgraded “grandfathered” sources with their typi-
cally subpar pollution control efficiencies could undercut the balance struck in the NSPS 
program between economic expansion and pollution reduction. Congress responded to this 
potential concern by expanding the reach of the NSPS program to include “modifications” 
to existing sources that result in increased emissions. 
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 The term “modification” is broadly defined to include “any 
physical or operational change to an existing facility which results 
in an increase in the emission rate.”77 Recognizing the wide net 
cast by this definition, the regulations establish a series of excep-
tions. These exceptions, which include activities such as perform-
ance of routine maintenance and repair or improvement of produc-
tion rate accomplished without capital expenditures, are not con-
sidered modifications even if they result in emission increases. 
From the enforcement perspective, regulators face a significant 
burden: given the enormous number of facilities out there, how 
does one identify specific sources that have been modified?78 Al-
though regulators have the authority to enter and inspect facili-
ties in search of modifications, direct inspection is likely to be nei-
ther efficient nor effective. One can easily imagine the enormous 
difficulties facing the regulator in selecting appropriate target fa-
cilities and detecting relevant modifications among numerous 
boilers, reactors, degreasers, and other potentially regulated 
equipment within the selected facilities. 
 Mandatory disclosure is an obvious enforcement tool in such 
circumstances; the facility itself is in the best position to identify 
those changes that amount to a modification. In fact, mandatory 
disclosure is exactly what the EPA chose in these circumstances. 
Section 60.7(a)(4) of the NSPS regulations sets out a number of 
notification obligations intended to assist the government in iden-
tifying potential violations of the rule.79 One of those notifications 
relates to modifications:  
(a) Any owner or operator subject to the provisions of [the NSPS] 
shall furnish the Administrator written notification . . . as follows: 
 . . . .  
 (4) A notification of any physical or operational change to an ex-
isting facility which may increase the emission rate of any air pol-
lutant to which a standard applies, unless that change is specifi-
cally exempted [from the definition of modification.]80 
                                                                                                                    
 77. 40 C.F.R. § 60.14(a) (2004). 
 78. It is estimated that the EPA and its state partners are regulating as many as 
eight million entities at any given time. Jon D. Silberman, Does Environmental Deterrence 
Work? Evidence and Experience Say Yes, but We Need to Understand How and Why, 30 
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10523, 10523 (2000). 
 79. 40 C.F.R. § 60.7(a)(4); see Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources: 
Modification, Notification, and Reconstruction, 39 Fed. Reg. 36,946, 36,948 (Oct. 15, 1974) 
(observing that revisions were being proposed “to require source owners or operators to 
also notify the Administrator . . . prior to the commencement of a potential modification of 
an existing facility [and that] [s]ection 114 of the Act provides that the Administrator may 
require such reports ‘for the purpose . . . of determining whether any person is in violation 
of any such standard’”). 
 80. 40 C.F.R. § 60.7(a)(4) (emphasis added). 
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 On its face, the NSPS disclosure asks Burde to answer a rather 
straightforward question: Did the changes at RBS fall within the 
listed exceptions or not? There is no doubt that regulators under-
stand that in many cases the question is not so simple. As we will see 
later in Part IV, due to the ambiguous language of the exceptions 
and the fact-intensive analysis they require, their application gives 
rise to significant controversy. Yet nothing in the NSPS disclosure it-
self acknowledges the uncertainties inherent in the concept of “modi-
fication.” To see what a disclosure obligation that takes ambiguity 
into account looks like, we turn to the tax code. 
2.   Fuzzy Disclosure Under the Internal Revenue Code 
 On the other side of the RBS Industries plant, tax attorney Bill 
Moogan is faced with a disclosure question under the Internal Reve-
nue Code regarding the appropriate tax treatment of clean-up ex-
penditures. When RBS Industries bought the plant some twenty-
seven years ago, it, like many businesses at the time, did not even 
consider the possibility of subsurface contamination. Indeed, it was 
only when RBS began a plant expansion, including construction of a 
warehouse facility, that it discovered four large, underground storage 
tanks. Many of the tanks were corroded and their contents—various 
types of petroleum products and wastes—had long since seeped into 
the soil and groundwater. Work on the plant expansion halted as 
RBS engaged in an expedited and expensive environmental investi-
gation. The investigation culminated in the swift initiation of a 
cleanup, including tank and soil removal, installation of a soil vapor 
extraction system, and construction of a network of groundwater 
wells and associated groundwater treatment systems. With the cost 
of delaying the plant expansion looming relentlessly in the back-
ground, the investigation and cleanup were completed within a sin-
gle tax year. 
 After the dust settles, Moogan is left with the dilemma of how to 
treat the various investigation and clean-up costs for tax purposes. In 
most circumstances, taxpayers would prefer to treat expenses as de-
ductible from gross income, as this would reduce the tax due for the 
current year. To achieve this result, the taxpayer must characterize 
the expenditure as “ordinary and necessary” business expenses un-
der section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code.81 Ordinary and neces-
sary business expenses include such things as “incidental repairs 
which neither materially add to the value of the property nor appre-
ciably prolong its life.”82 To the dismay of many taxpayers, section 
263 prohibits a current deduction for capital expenditures, which in-
                                                                                                                    
 81.  I.R.C. § 162(a) (2000). 
 82. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 (1960). 
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clude amounts paid for “new buildings or for permanent improve-
ments or betterments made to increase the value of any property.”83 
Capitalized expenses do not reduce gross income in the current year, 
and therefore may be far less valuable to the taxpayer. As with many 
taxation issues, the real world stakes here can be quite high. For ex-
ample, in the RBS Industries scenario, assuming total costs of inves-
tigation and cleanup are $700,000, a current deduction against ordi-
nary income yields a tax benefit as high as $245,000.84 If, instead, the 
costs are added to the basis of the land (which is sold in twenty-five 
years), the tax benefit could be $92,000 or even lower, depending 
upon your assumptions.85 
 In dealing with the characterization of expenses, the IRS faces 
the same problem that EPA confronts under the Clean Air Act: the 
critical information regarding compliance rests primarily with the 
regulated entity. It is neither practical nor wise for the IRS to de-
scend upon each taxpayer and examine all or even some of their 
transactions each year. Instead, more so than EPA and many 
other regulators, the IRS depends heavily on mandatory disclo-
sure for enforcement. And so, much to our collective annual regret, 
most of us comply with the reporting obligation set out in IRC sec-
tion 6012(a)(1) and file our tax returns on April 15. Although the 
tax forms are complicated and in some cases seek significant sup-
porting documentation, they essentially call for only binary disclo-
sure. 
 Yet in cases where noncompliance reduces tax liability substan-
tially, the IRC adopts a fuzzy disclosure approach. IRC section 
6662(d) establishes the substantial underpayment penalty: taxpayers 
who take an aggressive position on a taxable item and ultimately 
lose are subject to a penalty equal to twenty percent of the under-
statement attributable to the position taken.86 Thus, if RBS Indus-
tries reduced its tax liability by $245,000 by improperly characteriz-
ing all clean-up costs as deductible items, it would be subject to a 
$49,000 substantial understatement penalty if discovered. Two es-
cape hatches built into section 6662(d) reflect Congress’s recognition 
of the fact that tax regulations are susceptible to a range of interpre-
tations of varying persuasive force. First, if the taxpayer’s ultimately 
losing position is nonetheless based on “substantial authority,” the 
substantial understatement penalty would not apply.87 Substantial 
                                                                                                                    
 83. I.R.C. § 263(a)(1). 
 84. Based on a marginal tax rate of thirty-five percent. 
 85. Based on a sale in twenty-five years, with a discount rate of four percent and as-
suming a marginal tax rate of thirty-five percent. The value could be even less if capital 
gains are taxed at a lower rate in year twenty-five.  
 86. I.R.C. § 6662(d). 
 87. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(i).  
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authority is typically considered as roughly equivalent to a forty per-
cent likelihood of success if challenged in court.88 Second, taxpayers 
lacking substantial authority for a position can still avoid the penalty 
by disclosing the relevant facts affecting the item’s tax treatment in 
the return or in a statement attached to the return.89 However, dis-
closure only saves the taxpayer from the penalty if there is at least a 
reasonable basis for the position.90 (“Reasonable basis” is generally 
described as being roughly equivalent to a twenty percent likelihood 
of success if challenged in court.91) 
 In practice, tax professionals tend to view the substantial under-
statement provision as raising primarily an issue of disclosure. For 
example, in the case of RBS, Bill Moogan is likely to explain the pro-
vision to firm managers as follows: “Unless we can establish substan-
tial authority for this position, we will have to disclose or else face a 
significant penalty.” This “disclosure-oriented” view is consistent 
with the Joint Committee’s explanation of the operation of the origi-
nal version of IRC Section 6662(d): 
Congress did not adopt an absolute standard that a taxpayer may 
take a position on a return only if, in fact, the position reflects the 
correct treatment of the item because, in some circumstances, tax 
advisors may be unable to reach so definitive a conclusion. Rather, 
Congress adopted a more flexible standard under which the courts 
may assure that taxpayers who take non-disclosed highly aggres-
sive filing positions are subject to the penalty while those who en-
deavor in good faith to fairly self-assess are not penalized.  
 . . . . 
 . . . [D]isclosure relief permits taxpayers to avoid the penalty 
when there is uncertainty as to whether there is substantial au-
thority for the treatment of the item.92 
Thus, the substantial understatement penalty provision does not 
“require” disclosure; it merely rewards it by reducing the penalty 
in the event of an audit. A good-faith actor could choose to ignore 
the opportunity for disclosure without transgressing the compli-
ance norm. Nonetheless, for purposes of evaluating the relative 
value of fuzzy disclosure, I will treat the substantial understate-
                                                                                                                    
 88. PENALTY PROVISIONS, supra note 63, at 155 tbl.7. The numerical value represents 
a “general consensus of scholars and practitioners based on a survey of the literature” per-
formed by the Joint Committee staff. Id.  
 89. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii). 
 90. Id. 
 91. PENALTY PROVISIONS, supra note 63, at 155 tbl.7. 
 92. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL 
RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982, at 217-18 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter REVENUE 
PROVISIONS] (emphasis added). 
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ment disclosure provision as a legal requirement so as to demon-
strate the potential relationship between the compliance norm and 
fuzzy disclosure. 
IV.   BINARY DISCLOSURE AND STRATEGIC NONCOMPLIANCE 
 What happens when law-abiding, good-faith actors like Kay Burde 
and Bill Moogan are faced with disclosure issues regarding RBS In-
dustries’ compliance? The simple answer is that they will compare 
the state of affairs at the facility with the required state of affairs 
laid out in the regulation. If the facility status does not meet or ex-
ceed the requirements of the regulation, they will report the devia-
tion. Inject a bit of ambiguity into the regulation, and the story be-
comes much more complicated, as they now have the opportunity to 
shape the meaning of the substantive regulation and the basic con-
cept of noncompliance. Part IV.A explores that question with an eye 
toward understanding how the form of the disclosure obligation 
might affect the outcome.    
A.   Ambiguity and the Compliance Decision 
 Kay Burde’s story picks up just as she notifies the plant’s op-
erations manager of the potential applicability of the NSPS re-
quirements and the associated disclosure obligation. The opera-
tions manager is responsible for making the decision whether to 
implement the NSPS requirements and whether to notify the EPA 
of the equipment changes. For purposes of this story, we assume 
that the operations manager is personally committed to complying 
with the law and finds institutional support for that stance in the 
firm’s ethics policy. Following that stance in this situation is com-
plicated by the fact that the replacement project has already been 
approved, the equipment ordered, and the plant production sched-
ules revised to accommodate the replacement work.  
 In this particular case, complying with the NSPS requirements 
would be both disruptive and costly for the company. Complying 
would be disruptive because of the delay involved in designing and 
installing pollution control equipment and the need to rework pro-
duction, maintenance, and engineering schedules. Complying 
would be costly because of the expenses incurred in installing and 
operating the control technology and the financial losses caused by 
the delay. The compliance decision will have consequences for the 
operations manager as well. The financial losses and production 
delays will negatively impair his ability to meet quarterly and 
perhaps even annual performance goals set by corporate managers 
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for the plant and, consequently, for him.93 Moreover, installing the 
NSPS pollution controls would require the allocation of capital 
funds, a prospect that carries additional costs for him. First, in 
shepherding the capital request through the resource allocation 
process, he will expend limited personal resources and experience 
stress and inconvenience.94 Second, and perhaps more importantly, 
he faces potential opportunity costs because allocating funds to the 
pollution control project may restrict his ability to obtain capital 
funding for other desired projects.95 
 In addition to these financial and organizational costs, the op-
erations manager may also have to deal with “other firm norms 
and goals that conflict with the compliance norm.”96 One often en-
counters situations in everyday life in which seemingly inconsis-
tent social norms are triggered.97 For the firm manager, generally 
held social norms such as the compliance norm may come into con-
flict with powerful norms generated within the firm. Common firm 
norms include the duty to minimize costs or increase revenue and 
being a “team player.”98 In the RBS Industries example, disrupting 
the “team’s” project and increasing firm costs by insisting on com-
pliance with the NSPS standards could subject the operations 
manager to the social and psychological sanctions associated with 
transgressing firm norms.  
 Consequently, the operations manager will be making the com-
pliance decision under a significant amount of pressure, facing two 
sets of competing norms and their associated costs. Law and 
norms scholars would tell us that he will violate the NSPS stan-
dards if the material, social, and psychological costs to him for fol-
lowing the compliance norm exceed the costs to him for violating 
that norm.99 That may well be the case where the mandates of the 
respective norms are clear and the manager’s alternatives are lim-
ited to choosing between those two courses of action. However, this 
                                                                                                                    
 93. See, e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 20; Charles W.L. Hill et al., An Em-
pirical Examination of the Causes of Corporate Wrongdoing in the United States, 45 HUM. 
REL. 1055 (1992); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social 
Norms in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55 (2003). 
 94. See e.g., Malloy, supra note 17, at 471. 
 95. See id. 
 96. Id. at 507; see, e.g., Erik Jansen & Mary Ann Von Glinow, Ethical Ambivalence 
and Organizational Reward Systems, 10 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 814, 815 (1985) (describing the 
operation of “counternorms” within organizations). 
 97. ELSTER, supra note 21, at 104 (“At any given time we believe in many different 
norms, which may have contradictory implications for the situation at hand.”); Malloy, su-
pra note 17, at 507. 
 98. See DEVIANCE IN THE WORKPLACE, supra note 32, at 39, 41-47 (Ida Harper Simp-
son & Richard L. Simpson eds., 1999) (discussing the norm of being a “team player”); 
Malloy, supra note 17, at 507. 
 99. See supra text accompanying notes 93-98. 
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view fails to consider the possibility that the manager will seek to 
reconcile the competing norms, rather than choose one over the 
other. In such cases, the ambiguous nature of the NSPS regula-
tions provides the manager with a bridge between the ostensibly 
contradictory norms, making the choice between the two unneces-
sary. In making his decision under such conditions, the manager 
will likely focus intensely on articulating exactly what “the law” 
is.100 If he can define the legal requirement so as to avoid its appli-
cation to the pump changeout, he will elude both the NSPS re-
quirements and the social and psychological impacts of violating 
the compliance norm.101  
 Part III observed that in many cases the open texture or ambi-
guity of regulation results in a range of possible interpretations, 
ranging from the frivolous to the well-supported.102 For example, in 
defining the applicable legal standard, the operations manager 
would likely focus on characterizing the pump changeout as “rou-
tine maintenance, repair, [or] replacement” rather than a modifi-
cation.103 EPA applies the term “routine” on a case-by-case basis, 
looking at four factors in light of business practices in the rele-
vant industry sector: the purpose of the physical change, its na-
ture and extent, its cost, and the frequency of prior similar 
                                                                                                                    
 100. In order to simplify the analysis, the scenario assumes that the operations man-
ager is the single individual making both the legal decision of whether the regulations 
apply and the “business” decision of whether to comply. In a more realistic scenario, the 
environmental manager would likely make an initial judgment about the applicability of 
the rule (perhaps in consultation with legal counsel) and advise the operations manager 
of potential regulatory impacts. The operations manager might then make the final deci-
sion of how to proceed, perhaps after more interaction with the environmental manager, 
legal counsel, and the plant manager. The behavior of each participant in the process 
would be affected by that participant’s level of commitment to the compliance norm and 
the costs the participant would individually incur by acting in accordance with that 
norm.  
 101. One may ask why the manager would choose to interpret the regulation to ac-
commodate a firm norm such as cost reduction rather than redefining the firm norm so 
as to fit the regulation. One possible answer has to do with the social context in which 
the decision is being made. While the manager is likely to face some (and perhaps much) 
resistance from his peers within the firm to altering the shared definition of the firm 
norm, he is less likely to encounter resistance to redefining the legal requirement. More-
over, the potential costs to him of violating firm norms (which could include significant 
material and social consequences) may be more tangible than the costs of violating the 
compliance norm (which may be limited for the foreseeable future to a feeling of guilt 
and other internal psychological impacts). 
 102. While different people will judge the strength of a position in different ways, 
two common metrics are likely: (1) the probability that a court would uphold the posi-
tion or (2) the level of support found for the position in the relevant controlling au-
thority. 
 103. Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans; 
Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; and Standards for Performance for 
New Stationary Sources, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,313, 32,316 (July 21, 1992) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, and 60). 
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changes.104 Under a conservative reading of this “four-factor” test, 
the EPA would likely argue that the RBS Industries replacement 
project is not routine. The changeout increased the capacity of the 
production process rather than restoring it to its original design 
capacity, required a longer shutdown of the facility than other 
maintenance normally calls for, and was the first such replace-
ment performed at the plant.105 
 In seeking to avoid application of the NSPS, RBS Industries’ 
manager can select from at least three other interpretations of the 
NSPS and its routine maintenance exception. First, he can argue 
that the Clean Air Act is unconstitutional, a position generally 
viewed as bold but frivolous. Second, he can apply EPA’s four-
factor test differently. For example, he may conclude that al-
though the effect of the replacement may be an increase in capac-
ity, the primary purpose was to reduce the number of production 
process outages caused by failures of the existing pumps. Rather 
than engage in repeated repairs, the engineers decided to replace 
the motors. He may also determine that although RBS Industries 
has never performed a similar replacement in the last thirty years, 
other similar plants have, making this type of replacement fre-
quent in the industry although not in this particular company. 
Third, he may simply reject EPA’s four-factor test in its entirety, 
concluding that evaluations of whether a replacement is routine 
should be based only on whether the activity is common within the 
industry sector.106   
 Suppose that in this case, Burde evaluated the various inter-
pretations as shown below in Figure 2, in order of ascending level 
of legal support: 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                    
 104. See In re Tenn. Valley Auth., 9 E.A.D. 357, 359 (E.A.B. 2000); Letter from 
Francis X. Lyons, Region 5 Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, to 
Henry Nickel, Counsel for the Detroit Edison Company, Hunton & Williams LLP 2 
(May 23, 2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter Nickel Letter].  
 105. The EPA typically takes the position that physical changes having the pur-
pose and effect of increasing operating capacity or efficiency are generally not routine. 
Nickel Letter, supra note 104, at 1; Letter from Donald C. Toensing, Chief, Air Per-
mitting & Compliance Branch, to Wayne E. Penrod, Senior Manager, Environment, 
Sunflower Electric Power Corporation (August 28, 1998) (on file with author) (conclud-
ing that changes resulting in greater operating capacity are not routine). Also, in ana-
lyzing the nature of a change, the EPA considers extended shutdowns to typically be 
associated with nonroutine changes. Tenn. Valley Auth., 9 E.A.D. at 406.   
 106. See Tenn. Valley Auth., 9 E.A.D. at 393-96 (describing and rejecting that ar-
gument by TVA); CLEAN AIR ACT INFO. NETWORK, EPA’S RECENT NSR 
INTERPRETATIONS CONFLICT WITH FEDERAL AND STATE LAW, 4-5 (March 2000), avail-
able at http://envinfo.com /caain/may2000/nsr.pdf. 
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FIGURE 2 
INTERPRETATION LEVEL OF LEGAL SUPPORT 
Interpretation A 
(Clean Air Act and NSPS provisions 
are unconstitutional) 
Frivolous 
Interpretation B 
(Rejection of four-factor test)  
Reasonable Basis 
Interpretation C 
(Reading of four-factor test so as to 
favor RBS) 
Reasonable Basis 
Interpretation D 
(EPA’s strict application of the four-
factor test) 
Substantial Authority 
 
For most good-faith actors, an obviously frivolous position such as In-
terpretation A would create a direct conflict with the compliance 
norm and thus be rejected. Interpretations B and C are more defen-
sible from a normative standpoint, with each being at least a reason-
able reading of the provision. Thus, the operations manager can rely 
on either to concur on the completion of the project absent pollution 
controls, without feeling that he has violated the compliance norm.107 
Ambiguity in the law therefore offers the good-faith actor the oppor-
tunity to have his normative cake and eat it too. However, from the 
perspective of the regulatory agency, the firm would be in violation of 
the NSPS and, if detected, would likely be subject to enforcement ac-
tion. 
 I want to take a moment to consider the role of economic rational-
ity under these circumstances. I do not mean to suggest that the ra-
                                                                                                                    
 107. How, then, would the good-faith strategic actor choose between these two inter-
pretations? Putting aside the role of cognitive biases until later in the Article, there is very 
little empirical information available on the decision processes used by managers, lawyers, 
and other compliance professionals to make legal judgments. See Marjorie Anne McDiar-
mid, Lawyer Decision Making: The Problem of Prediction, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1847, 1848-49 
(commenting on the lack of empirical information regarding how lawyers make decisions, 
particularly in discharging the counseling function). But see Keith J. Holyoak & Dan 
Simon, Bidirectional Reasoning in Decision Making by Constraint Satisfaction, 128 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 3 (1999); Dan Simon et al., The Emergence of Coherence 
over the Course of Decision Making, 27 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY & 
COGNITION 1250 (2001) (studying legal decisionmaking in experimental settings and focus-
ing primarily on the processes involved in rendering a verdict or acting as a judge). The de-
cision theory literature discusses a number of strategies used by individuals for making 
decisions, including the weighted additive rule, the equal weight heuristic, the satisficing 
heuristic, the lexicographic heuristic, the elimination-by-aspects heuristic, and the major-
ity of confirming dimensions heuristic. See JOHN W. PAYNE ET AL., THE ADAPTIVE DECISION 
MAKER 22-29 (1993) (providing an overview of decision strategies). 
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tional calculus is irrelevant to Kay Burde and the operations man-
ager in the context of strategic noncompliance. No one has quite fig-
ured out how the two interact, but my sense is that economic ration-
ality and normative concerns will act as constraints on one another 
in compliance decisions. For example, we often see compliance with a 
clear legal obligation even where both the chances of detection of a 
violation and the size of the penalty are low. It is likely that in such 
cases the compliance norm is moderating the effect of economic ra-
tionality. Conversely, even where the compliance norm may be satis-
fied with a doubtful but reasonable position, economic rationality 
may cause the firm to comply, for example, where the firm’s actions 
are very visible and the penalties for violation are quite high. 
B.   Social Influences on Strategic Noncompliance 
 In making the choice between the agency interpretation and his 
more favorable readings, the manager is likely to be strongly influ-
enced by his immediate social environment.108 In particular, beyond 
the firm norms discussed previously, social networks within the firm 
and external to the firm are also potential sources of encouragement 
for strategic behavior.  
 First, the manager may receive support for strategic noncompli-
ance from peers within the firm to the extent that the manager en-
gages others in the decisionmaking process. For example, a manager 
faced with a compliance decision may discuss the situation with oth-
ers, including subordinates and peers at the plant, as well as other 
managers at the corporate office.109 Psychologists and other social sci-
entists have identified numerous mechanisms by which the behavior 
of an individual is influenced by the group. In some circumstances, 
the quality of the decisionmaking outcome may be improved by a 
group approach, particularly by allowing the pooling of information 
and skills and the correction of individual biases.110 However, group 
discussion can also enhance individual decisionmaking biases and in-
tensify the power of shared firm norms. For example, consider the po-
tential impact of group polarization, a process by which discussion 
within a group tends to intensify opinion such that the group pro-
duces more extreme judgments than existed prior to the group dis-
                                                                                                                    
 108. See PAYNE, supra note 107, at 254 (noting that decision strategy selection may be 
influenced by social factors); SCOTT, supra note 21; ELSTER, supra note 21. 
 109. Such consultations and discussions could take on attributes of group decisionmak-
ing, although the ultimate decision may rest with one manager. 
 110. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate 
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12-27 (2002) (surveying experimental studies comparing 
individual and group decisionmaking); Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Confor-
mity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 530-35 (2002) 
(acknowledging that research indicates that group decisionmaking may be superior for 
problem solving involving analysis and evaluation). 
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cussion. In groups that share a norm, polarization appears to be 
caused by the tendency of group members to engage in “social com-
parison,” in which they attempt to signal the strength of their com-
mitment to the norm.111 Where the group norm is running a lean op-
eration (that is, keeping costs down), polarization can drive individu-
als within the group to adopt a more aggressive interpretation of a 
regulation than any single group member might have adopted.112 
 Second, the manager’s decision may also be influenced by peers 
outside the company or by professional advisors who provide both 
technical support and encouragement of strategic noncompliance. For 
example, both the environmental manager and the operations man-
ager are likely to be members of trade associations and professional 
organizations that provide their members with information concern-
ing the industry position on various regulatory issues of importance. 
This information can often include analysis of agency interpretation 
of regulations and dissemination of alternative interpretations.113 The 
                                                                                                                    
 111. Seidenfeld, supra note 110, at 535-36; see also Robert Steven Baron & Gard Roper, 
Reaffirmation of Social Comparison Views of Choice Shifts: Averaging and Extremity Ef-
fects in an Autokinetic Situation, 33 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 521, 528-30 (1976). 
Polarization also appears to be caused by the aggregate effect of the quantity and quality of 
the information and arguments that the individual may hear in the course of group discus-
sions.  
 112. See Seidenfeld, supra note 110, at 536-37 (illustrating how polarization could lead 
EPA engineers developing a regulation to adopt a more stringent standard than others out-
side the group would have). Of course, as observed supra note 101, polarization can affect 
many types of attitudes. Why then would not the compliance norm, rather than the cost 
minimization norm, be enhanced in the group setting? Indeed, in some cases in which the 
firm has a strong commitment to compliance, polarization might very well lead the firm to 
“overcomply.” In others, however, its impact may well depend on which of several compet-
ing norms is most salient at the time the decision is being made. Robert B. Cialdini et al., 
A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: A Theoretical Refinement and Reevaluation of the 
Role of Norms in Human Behavior, in 24 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 201, 204 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1991) (“[N]orms motivate and direct action 
primarily when they are activated (i.e., made salient or otherwise focused upon.”)). 
 113. The EPA’s enforcement case against the Tennessee Valley Authority is a useful 
example. See In re Tenn. Valley Auth., 9 E.A.D. 357 (E.A.B. 2000). That case involved four-
teen “life extension projects” performed by the Tennessee Valley Authority at nine power 
plants between 1982 and 1996 in three states, in which TVA replaced or upgraded sub-
stantial components of its boilers and replaced thousands of feet of pipe. Id. at 365-67. TVA 
characterized the projects as routine maintenance rather than modifications. TVA argued 
that a physical change is routine if the activity is common within the relevant industry 
sector. Id. at 393-94. EPA’s Environmental Appeals Board rejected the argument and de-
scribed how trade organization meetings serve as forums for distribution of “how-to” direc-
tions for strategic noncompliance: 
Given the extent of rehabilitation efforts . . . , TVA’s construction of the excep-
tion would, carried to its logical conclusion, allow TVA to rebuild an entire facil-
ity without triggering new source review so long as it did so in increments that 
can be identified elsewhere in the industry. Indeed there is evidence that this 
was an important part of TVA’s design. For example, in 1984, a TVA official 
made the following statement in notes which he typed and submitted to his su-
pervisor after attending an industry life-extension conference[:] 
One statement concerning environmental regulations will need to be kept in 
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distribution of this type of information by such organizations not only 
provides managers with the technical and legal positions to support 
strategic noncompliance but also may enhance the individual man-
ager’s perception that the positions are commonly used, defensible 
readings of the regulation.114 
 Likewise, legal and technical consultants can often provide firms 
the expertise needed to develop and implement aggressive interpre-
tations of law.115 For instance, several studies in the area of taxation 
conclude that the involvement of tax practitioners results in greater 
noncompliance with respect to ambiguous items and higher levels of 
compliance for more straightforward items.116 The legal profession in 
particular appears to embrace strategic noncompliance as a valuable 
part of the service it provides to clients.117 Many lawyers interpret 
the professional norms that govern their behavior to require that at-
torneys assist clients in identifying and exploiting ambiguities, gaps, 
                                                                                                                    
mind if massive unit rehab projects are undertaken. If modifications proposed 
are extensive enough to be considered reconstruction, EPA might try to apply 
the new source performance standards. This could erase one major advantage 
of life extension over new plant construction. 
Id. at 394-95 (citations omitted). 
 114. In such circumstances, managers may rely upon the positions disseminated by 
their respective trade or professional association with less forethought than they would 
otherwise use. Examples of this type of “herd behavior” in the business community have 
been discussed by a number of economists and legal scholars. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra 
note 1, at 1037-40; Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Con-
tracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 
355-56 (1996); David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 
AM. ECON. REV. 465, 477-78 (1990). 
 115. See Robert Kidder & Craig McEwen, Taxpaying Behavior in Social Context: A 
Tentative Typology of Tax Compliance and Noncompliance, in 2 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE 47, 
62 (Jeffrey A. Roth & John T. Scholz eds., 1989) (discussing the role of “compliance bro-
kers” in facilitating noncompliance); McBarnet, supra note 23, at 339-40 (describing tech-
niques used by accountants to “redescribe” operations in more innocuous terms). 
 116. See, e.g., James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 818, 
846-47 (1998); Brian Erard, Taxation with Representation: An Analysis of the Role of Tax 
Practitioners in Tax Compliance, 52 J. PUB. ECON. 163, 165-67 (1993); Steven Klepper et al. 
Expert Intermediaries and Legal Compliance: The Case of Tax Preparers, 34 J.L. & ECON. 
205, 228 (1991). But see Eric M. Rice, The Corporate Tax Gap: Evidence on Tax Compliance 
by Small Corporations, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 125, 127 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (find-
ing “no clear association of compliance . . . or the use of an outside CPA for tax prepara-
tion”).  
 117. For example, section 2.01(b)(1) of the American Law Institute’s Principles of Cor-
porate Governance recommends that corporations be obliged to act within the boundaries 
set by law, a recommendation that is grounded in the “norm of obedience.” PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(b)(1) & cmt. g at 60 
(1994). The comments to that section go on to note that “[i]n determining these boundaries 
the corporation should not rest simply on past precedents or an unduly literal reading of 
statutes and regulations, but should give weight to all the considerations that the courts 
would deem proper to take into account in their determinations, including relevant princi-
ples, policies, and legislative purposes.” Id. § 2.01 cmt. g at 60. 
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and loopholes in the law. This perspective is sometimes called the cli-
ent service model of lawyering.118 
 Several commentators have observed that compliance profession-
als and lawyers tend to overstate legal risks and obligations, raising 
the specter of government intrusion and enforcement where there is 
little likelihood of either.119 They argue that excessive conservatism 
in dispensing advice flows in part from self-interested motives, such 
as increasing fees, establishing power, or minimizing downside risks 
(in terms of reputational harm and financial liability) associated with 
being wrong. In addition, the “overstatement” effect, if in fact there is 
one, is said to result from professional norms of caution.120 Yet the 
notion that lawyers and other consultants may overstate legal risk is 
not fundamentally inconsistent with the idea that those same parties 
encourage or assist in strategic noncompliance. Take the case of the 
environmental manager who purposely exaggerates legal risk in or-
der to bolster her importance and influence within the firm. Her 
reputation as a smart, “can-do” manager is furthered if, in addition to 
uncovering a significant legal risk, she is able to identify and imple-
ment an aggressive interpretation of the law that ultimately avoids 
that risk.  
C.   Strategic Noncompliance and Biased Predecision Processing 
 Thus far, I have discussed factors that the manager consciously 
takes into account when engaging in strategic noncompliance. Some 
mention should also be made of “preconscious” influences on the 
compliance decision; that is, mental processes such as cognitive bi-
ases of which the decisionmaker is unaware.121 In particular, I focus 
on the phenomenon of biased predecision processing, which occurs 
when individuals alter their view of the decision environment so as to 
favor one alternative over another.122 But first, I will address the 
“self-serving bias.” 
                                                                                                                    
 118. For an overview of the debate surrounding the client service model and the com-
peting “public service” model, see David Dana, Environmental Lawyers and the Public Ser-
vice Model of Lawyering, 74 OR. L. REV. 57 (1995); and Ted Schneyer, Fuzzy Models of the 
Corporate Lawyer as Environmental Compliance Counselor 74 OR. L. REV. 99 (1995). 
 119. Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat 
of Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 47 (1992); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. 
Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375 (1997).  
 120. Langevoort & Rasmussen, supra note 119, at 389-99. 
 121. See Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A Behavioral Inquiry into 
Lawyers’ Responsibility for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 97 (1993) (defining the 
concept of preconscious mental processes).  
 122. Aaron L. Brownstein, Biased Predecision Processing, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 545, 545 
(2003). 
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 Recently, many commentators have used the self-serving bias to 
explain, among other things, why various forms of self-disclosure and 
third-party disclosure such as independent auditing are substantially 
flawed.123 Reliance on self-serving bias can be problematic when it is 
invoked without defining the specific bias involved or the particular 
type of choice or judgment being affected.124 There is no single defini-
tion of the “self-serving bias”; rather, it is an umbrella term for vari-
ous cognitive biases, each having an egocentric element of some 
sort.125 For example, it can refer to skewing judgments of fairness in 
one’s own favor,126 disregarding newly acquired information that con-
tradicts a position already taken,127 or attributing more skill, knowl-
edge, or other qualities to oneself than is objectively justified.128 
These biases are driven by different mechanisms and likely exhibit 
diverse boundary conditions.129 Accordingly, cautious analysis of the 
role of a self-serving bias in any given context requires a matching of 
the type of decision involved with the relevant strand of self-serving 
bias literature.130 With that admonition in mind, I selected the strand 
regarding biased predecision processing, and particularly research on 
motivated reasoning.  
 Biased predecision processing can occur in situations in which an 
individual must choose between two or more alternatives, particu-
larly under conditions of ambiguity.131 Research in a variety of set-
                                                                                                                    
 123. See, e.g., Max H. Bazerman et al., The Impossibility of Auditor Independence, 
SLOAN MGMT. REV., Summer 1997, at 89, 91 (discussing auditor judgments and concluding 
that “[w]hen people are called on to make impartial judgments, those judgments are likely 
to be unconsciously and powerfully biased in a manner that is commensurate with the 
judge’s self-interest”); Erica Beecher-Monas, Corporate Governance in the Wake of Enron: 
An Examination of the Audit Committee Solution to Corporate Fraud, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 
357, 380-81 (2003) (arguing that information is processed so as to result in decisions favor-
able to the decisionmaker); Langevoort, supra note 1, at 144 (describing the notion of “self-
serving inference” as a “fundamental construct in social cognition”); Robert A. Prentice, 
The SEC and MDP: Implications of the Self-Serving Bias for Independent Auditing, 61 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1597, 1606 (2000) (stating that the pervasive human tendency to act consis-
tent with one’s own self-interest is caused by a “deliciously complex blend of cognitive limi-
tations and motivational drives”). 
 124. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 123, at 380-81 (referencing studies regarding ego-
centric attribution bias in a discussion of why corporate directors may be predisposed to 
tolerate “iffy” disclosures); Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behav-
ioral Insight into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133, 168-70 (2000) (relying 
on studies regarding the effect of self-interest on judgments of fairness to support the no-
tion that auditors will skew judgments regarding the adequacy of financial statements). 
 125. Ward Farnsworth, The Legal Regulation of Self-Serving Bias, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 567, 568 (2003). 
 126. Bazerman et al., supra note 123, at 90-91; Prentice, supra note 123, at 1609. 
 127. Langevoort, supra note 1, at 135-39. 
 128. Id. at 139-41; Farnsworth, supra note 125, at 569. 
 129. Farnsworth, supra note 125, at 570. 
 130. For examples of this type of careful analysis, see id. at 569-80; Langevoort, supra 
note 1, at 135-48. 
 131. See J. Edward Russo et al., Predecisional Distortion of Product Information, 35 J. 
MARKETING RES. 438, 448 (1998) (noting that information distortion is most pronounced 
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tings indicates that as individuals begin to evaluate the alternatives, 
an early favorite will start to emerge. While still in the predecision 
stage, many individuals will begin to bolster that favorite alternative 
by restructuring the decision environment so as to support selection 
of the alternative.132 Restructuring includes skewing the information 
sought as part of the decisionmaking process, slanting evaluation of 
the collected information,133 and reassessing the perceived positive 
and negative attributes of the various alternatives.134  
 Much of the research on biased predecision processing involves 
experimental settings in which the subjects exhibited no significant 
preference for any of the alternatives at the start of the experi-
ments.135 During the course of the experiments, the individual’s pref-
erence for one alternative grew, fed by various bolstering activities.136 
Kunda and other researchers have examined decisionmaking where 
the individual has a strong preference in terms of outcome before the 
decisionmaking process begins, a situation somewhat more akin to 
what goes on in the firm.137 Under those circumstances, she con-
cluded that individuals engage in a form of biased predecisional proc-
essing called “motivated reasoning,” in which individuals seek out in-
formation and decisionmaking strategies that support the desired 
outcome.138 Motivated reasoning apparently reaches within the firm; 
                                                                                                                    
when equivocal information presented). 
 132. Brownstein, supra note 122, at 558. Not all researchers use the term “biased pre-
decision processing” to describe this phenomenon. In their studies of legal decisionmaking, 
Simon and his colleagues characterize it as bidirectional processing in which “the evidence 
influences the conclusions and, at the same time, the emerging conclusion affects the 
evaluation of the evidence.” Dan Simon et al., The Redux of Cognitive Consistency Theories: 
Evidence Judgments by Constraint Satisfaction, 86 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 814, 
814 (2004). 
 133. See, e.g., Jürgen Beckmann & Julius Kuhl, Altering Information to Gain Action 
Control: Functional Aspects of Human Information Processing in Decision Making, 18 J. 
RES. PERSONALITY 224, 226-27 (1984). 
 134. See Henry Montgomery, Towards a Perspective Theory of Decision Making and 
Judgment, 87 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 155, 168-69 (1994) (suggesting that individuals build a 
“dominance structure” so that the favored alternative appears superior to other alterna-
tives on at least one attribute and at least equal to them on other attributes). 
 135. For example, one typical experiment presented subjects with photographs and 
biographical profiles of potential partners in a subsequent space flight exercise. See Edgar 
O’Neal, Influence of Future Choice Importance and Arousal upon the Halo Effect, 19 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 334 (1971). In another, subjects were asked to choose be-
tween two dry cleaners based on six attributes. See J. Edward Russo et al., Predecisional 
Distortion of Information by Auditors and Salespersons, 46 MGMT. SCI. 13 (2000).  
 136. Russo et al., supra note 135, at 13. 
 137. Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480 (1990). 
 138. Id. at 493. Motivated reasoning has also been called “desirability bias” and “alle-
giance bias.” See Keith D. Markman & Edward R. Hirt, Social Prediction and the “Alle-
giance Bias,” 20 SOC. COGNITION 58, 58 (2002) (defining allegiance bias as “the rendering of 
biased predictions by individuals who are psychologically invested in a desired outcome”); 
Robert A. Olsen, Desirability Bias Among Professional Investment Managers: Some Evi-
dence from Experts, 10 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 65, 65 (1997) (defining desirability bias 
as “the tendency to overpredict desirable outcomes and underpredict unwanted outcomes”). 
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several experimental studies have demonstrated its application to 
business professionals (including investment managers, auditors, ac-
countants, and salespersons) making expert judgments such as pre-
dicting occurrence of potential events of economic significance,139 pre-
dicting the likelihood that a tax position would be sustained in 
court,140 and allocating limited resources as between two audit cli-
ents.141 
 The notion that motivated reasoning can undermine the compli-
ance norm finds support in a separate line of research in social psy-
chology relating to how norms are triggered. Social psychologists 
theorize that norm activation occurs when the individual detects cues 
in the environment that make the norm relevant.142 The concept of 
norm activation has been used in analyzing the operation of a variety 
of social norms, including norms that encourage recycling, manage-
ment of hazardous chemicals, and energy conservation.143 Like other 
social norms, the compliance norm only becomes salient when the in-
dividual becomes aware of situational cues that indicate it is ger-
                                                                                                                    
Motivating reasoning has been demonstrated in a variety of studies by researchers work-
ing in different paradigms, some of which look at how people form and reform attitudes 
and beliefs as well as how they make decisions. Kunda, supra note 137, at 493.  
 139. Olsen, supra note 138, at 70. 
 140. C. Bryan Cloyd & Brian C. Spilker, The Influence of Client Preferences on Tax Pro-
fessionals’ Search for Judicial Precedents, Subsequent Judgments and Recommendations, 
74 ACCT. REV. 299 (1999); Andrew D. Cuccia et al., The Ability of Professional Standards to 
Mitigate Aggressive Reporting, 70 ACCT. REV. 227 (1995). The Cuccia study is often cited as 
evidence of motivated reasoning. See Russo et al., supra note 135, at 13. However, one 
must be cautious in drawing too much from the study in terms of motivational or cognitive 
biases. While that study showed, among other things, that accountants will be more or less 
aggressive in their reporting positions depending upon their clients taste for risk, it pro-
vides no direct support for the notion that the behavior was due to preconscious rather 
than conscious factors. 
 141. Russo et al., supra note 135, at 21-22. 
 142. ELIOT R. SMITH & DIANE M. MACKIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 377 (2d ed. 2000); 
Cialdini et al., supra note 112, at 204; Shalom H. Schwartz, Normative Influences on Altru-
ism, 10 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 221, 227, 241 (1977) [hereinafter 
Schwartz, Normative Influences]; Shalom Schwartz, The Justice of Need and the Activation 
of Humanitarian Norms, 31 J. SOC. ISSUES 111, 114-30 (1975) [hereinafter Schwartz, Hu-
manitarian Norms] (using norm activation theory to explain the operation of humanitarian 
norms, meaning norms that encourage helping behavior or altruism such as aiding indi-
viduals in distress). “Norm activation” was first articulated as such by Schwartz in analyz-
ing the relationship between humanitarian norms (such as the norm of helping others in 
need) and actual behavior. See Russell Blamey, The Activation of Environmental Norms: 
Extending Schwartz’s Model, 30 ENV’T & BEHAV. 676 (1998) (providing an overview of 
norm activation). 
 143. See J. Stanley Black et al., Personal and Contextual Influences on Household En-
ergy Adaptations, 70 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 3, 13-17 (1985) (analyzing how norms affect en-
ergy conservation); Blamey, supra note 142, at 677 (providing a summary of its application 
in other areas); Gregory A. Guagnano et al., Influences on Attitude-Behavior Relationships: 
A Natural Experiment with Curbside Recycling, 27 ENV’T & BEHAV. 699, 713-14 (1995) (ap-
plying the model to recycling); Paul C. Stern et al., Support for Environmental Protection: 
The Role of Moral Norms, 8 POPULATION & ENV’T 204 (1986) (applying the model to man-
agement of hazardous chemicals).  
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mane.144 However, this initial assessment of external cues is just one 
element of a complex process. The activation process also includes 
evaluation of the likely outcomes of complying with the potentially 
activated norm and of violating it. This evaluation involves consid-
eration of the social, physical, psychological, and moral costs and 
benefits of each course of action.145 As in the RBS Industries example, 
this evaluation may reveal a serious potential conflict, particularly 
where the economic, social, and psychological costs of both compli-
ance and noncompliance are high.146 
 The individual can avoid this conflict by redefining the situation 
to ensure the norm is not activated, a process known as defensive de-
nial.147 In one form of defensive denial, the individual interprets the 
environmental cues to avoid triggering the norm.148 For example, in 
                                                                                                                    
 144. Elsewhere I have observed that in the context of the firm, “the compliance norm is 
activated when the firm manager or employee (1) knows of the legal standard, (2) is aware 
of business activities that are potentially governed by the standard, and (3) believes that 
he or she has the authority and/or responsibility within the firm to initiate actions leading 
to compliance.” Malloy, supra note 17, at 483. These criteria mirror those used by Schwartz 
and others in applying the norm activation model to humanitarian norms. Schwartz recog-
nized that the concept of norm activation would be useful in understanding the operation 
of other norms. He hypothesized that among people holding a humanitarian norm, the 
norm is initially activated where the individual’s threshold assessment of a situation re-
sults in (1) awareness that another person or group is in need, (2) awareness that actions 
could be taken in response to the need, and (3) arousal of a sense of responsibility. 
Schwartz, Humanitarian Norms, supra note 142, at 116-20. 
 145. Blamey, supra note 142, at 679; Schwartz, Humanitarian Norms, supra note 142, 
at 126-28. Schwartz’s social costs include blame, fines, loss of promotions, and prosecution. 
Id. at 127. 
 146. Schwartz, Humanitarian Norms, supra note 142, at 128 (“Compliance with acti-
vated personal norms will satisfy one’s sense of moral obligation only at the expense of in-
curring substantial social, physical, and/or psychological costs.”). 
 147. Schwartz, Normative Influences, supra note 142, at 255-62; Tom R. Tyler et al., 
Defensive Denial and High Cost Prosocial Behavior, 3 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 267, 
267-68 (1982). For purposes of analysis, norm activation and defensive denial are typically 
described as a sequential process, much as decisionmaking and problem-solving processes 
are described in other literature. In practice, however, norm activation and defensive de-
nial are unlikely to flow in such a simplified, linear fashion. Rather, the sequence of steps 
may vary with the particular situation. For example, in some circumstances, defensive de-
nial may occur as part of the threshold assessment rather than as a separate step. 
Schwartz, Humanitarian Norms, supra note 142, at 115 (“The way in which the sequence 
develops in each particular instance is influenced both by situational and intraindividual 
variables.”). Moreover, although the assessments and evaluations are described as if they 
occur as part of conscious decisionmaking, it is more likely that they are, at least in part, 
the products of subconscious perceptions, cognitive heuristics and biases, and eventually 
even habit. Id. 
 148. Schwartz, Humanitarian Norms, supra note 142, at 128-29. There are two other 
forms, or “modes,” of denial. In the second form of defensive denial, the individual may re-
assess the situation to reduce any sense of responsibility to act, for example, by concluding 
that other individuals are better able or more qualified to respond. Id. at 128-29. In the 
third “mode” of denial, the individual may identify conflicting norms that mediate against 
compliance with the initially activated norm. Id. at 129. Used separately and in concert, 
these three modes of denial allow the individual to evade application of the norm while 
avoiding the internal sanctions that would otherwise accompany a norm violation. Id. at 
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the case of humanitarian norms, the individual may characterize the 
situation to understate the other person’s need for assistance or the 
likely harm that person will experience if no aid is given.149 Likewise, 
in the case of norms supporting energy conservation, individuals re-
sponded to high personal costs by altering their perceptions concern-
ing the seriousness of energy shortages or the harm caused by main-
taining current levels of energy use.150 Two factors influence the “de-
niability” of the cues in defensive denial: the relative ambiguity of the 
cues and the interpretation given them by others.151 As we saw above, 
each of these factors is certainly at play in strategic noncompliance. 
In the context of compliance decisions, regulations—the legal stan-
dards that trigger the compliance norm—offer a ready and fertile 
source of ambiguity. Moreover, interpretations offered by the man-
ager’s peers outside and inside the firm, as well as advice from the 
firm’s legal and technical consultants, can often provide strong sup-
port for aggressive readings of those regulations.152  
D.   The Dubious Role of Binary Disclosure 
 With all this in mind, I now consider the likely impact of a binary 
disclosure provision like the NSPS notification obligation on strategic 
noncompliance. Recall that disclosure operates through three mecha-
nisms: the reflexive mechanism, the deterrence mechanism, and the 
enhancement mechanism. This Part argues that the simple view of 
compliance reflected in most binary disclosure provisions undermines 
all of these mechanisms. With respect to the reflexive mechanism, 
binary disclosure fails to challenge the firm to be any more sophisti-
cated or self-reflective in making compliance decisions than the firm 
would otherwise be. Likewise, with regard to the deterrence and en-
hancement mechanisms, binary disclosure is unlikely to elicit and 
disseminate the type of information needed to trigger those mecha-
nisms.  
 1. Binary Disclosure and the Reflexive Mechanism 
 The reflexive mechanism aims at improving the firm’s compliance 
routines. In other words, by requiring the firm to systematically con-
                                                                                                                    
129-30; Tyler et al., supra note 147, at 268. 
 149. Schwartz, Humanitarian Norms, supra note 142, at 128-30. 
 150. In an experimental study of the effect of personal costs of energy conservation on 
the conservation norm, Tyler and his colleagues found that increased costs led to belief re-
definition of a type that lessened the subjects’ perceived need to engage in conservation; 
that is, subjects exposed to higher costs came to believe that the energy shortage occurring 
at the time of the study was not serious or that other citizens would not be harmed by lack 
of conservation. Tyler et al., supra note 147, at 269-73. 
 151. Schwartz, Normative Influences, supra note 142, at 256. 
 152. See supra Part IV.B. 
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sider the legal implications of its activities, the regulator hopes to en-
courage the development of high-level, self-critical organizational 
processes for identifying legal obligations and evaluating the firm’s 
responses to those obligations.153 This mechanism thus draws lessons 
from general management principles. For example, many firms at-
tempt to improve core planning and operational mechanisms by im-
plementing management systems that coordinate various depart-
ments, develop policies and decision tools, and establish operating 
routines.154 Where those systems use process to facilitate critical 
thinking about the firm’s performance, they take on a reflexive char-
acter. Thus, environmental management systems, which use a “plan-
do-check-act” cycle to evaluate compliance failures and respond, are 
often described as reflexive.155 As I noted above, a number of disclo-
sure programs further reflexive goals in that they mandate or en-
courage the development of self-reflective processes.156 
 Disclosure like that required under the NSPS provisions falls 
short of achieving reflexive goals. As a threshold matter, the NSPS 
provisions ask for a conclusion about compliance but neither require 
nor reward the firm’s implementation of a system for collecting and 
processing the information needed to reach that conclusion. Such a 
system would be particularly useful where the firm’s compliance 
problems are caused by poor communication and coordination be-
tween firm departments, managers, and employees, what I call “rou-
tine noncompliance.”157 Some forms of binary disclosure do include 
something akin to a system requirement; for example, under Title V 
of the Clean Air Act, major facilities are essentially required to per-
form a “reasonable inquiry” to support annual compliance certifica-
tions.158 Where the system requirement is lacking, as in the NSPS no-
tification and many other binary provisions, it is less probable that 
the disclosure obligation would consistently have reflexive effects. 
 More importantly, by ignoring ambiguity, binary disclosure fails to 
force the good-faith manager to critically assess her substantive posi-
tion regarding compliance. To understand this point, it helps to re-
member that the manager typically faces the question “Will the firm 
                                                                                                                    
 153. See Malloy, supra note 17, at 495-96 (discussing the potentially reflexive role of 
environmental management systems). 
 154. See PETER P. SCHODERBEK ET AL., MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: CONCEPTUAL 
CONSIDERATIONS (4th ed. 1980) (describing and evaluating the various forms of manage-
ment systems); Philippe Lorino, A Pragmatic Analysis of the Role of Management Systems 
in Organizational Learning, in KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
COMPETENCE 177 (Ron Sanchez ed., 2001). 
 155. See Orts, supra note 45, at 1252-54; J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the 
Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 
757, 848 (2003). 
 156. See supra text accompanying notes 153-55. 
 157. See Malloy, supra note 17, at 475. 
 158. 40 C.F.R. § 70.5(10)(d) (2004). 
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be in compliance?” in two contexts. First, the manager will consider 
the question when analyzing the underlying ambiguous substantive 
requirement. As Figure 3 illustrates, in that context a skilled practi-
tioner of strategic noncompliance would modify the question to be-
come: “Does the firm have a reasonable basis for its position?”159 In re-
sponding to the modified question, the manager will engage in a so-
phisticated evaluation of alternative viable legal positions and may ul-
timately select an aggressive, yet arguably reasonable, position.160  
 Second, in dealing with the issue of disclosure, the manager again 
confronts the question of whether the firm is in compliance.161 Now, 
to affect strategic noncompliance in a reflexive way, the disclosure 
provision should challenge the manager to critically assess her initial 
compliance evaluation and selected position. Yet, as shown in Figure 
3, without something more in responding to a binary disclosure pro-
vision that asks for notification of noncompliance, the strategic man-
ager will once again frame the crucial question as “Does the firm 
have a reasonable basis for its position?” In other words, binary dis-
closure provisions simply task the manager with answering the same 
question all over again. As I explain in Part V.B.1, fuzzy disclosure 
encourages a more critical reassessment of an aggressive legal posi-
tion by forcing the strategic, good-faith manager to frame the ques-
tion differently when making a compliance determination for pur-
poses of disclosure. 
FIGURE 3 
BINARY DISCLOSURE: THE TWO DECISIONS 
Substantive Decision 
Question:    
 Will the firm be in compliance? 
 
Framed As:  
 Does the firm have a reasonable            
 basis for its position? 
Disclosure Decision 
Question:    
 Will the firm be in compliance? 
 
Framed As:  
 Does the firm have a reasonable basis 
 for its position? 
                                                                                                                    
 159. Clearly, the manager might also consider a variety of other factors in determining 
which position of several to adopt beyond the legal sufficiency of the positions. For exam-
ple, the firm may gain some reputational value from adopting a conservative stance. For 
purposes of this analysis, I focus on this particular factor. 
 160. See supra text accompanying notes 102-07. 
 161. I do not mean to suggest that a manager would necessarily deal with the issues of 
substantive compliance and disclosure sequentially, although I believe that that does occur 
in many cases. It may be that some or many managers consider both aspects in tandem. 
Nonetheless this does not undercut my point here, which is that, depending upon its de-
sign, the disclosure provision could encourage the manager to be more critical in evaluat-
ing potential compliance positions than the manager would be otherwise. 
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 2.   Deterrence, Enhancement, and Binary Disclosure 
 Binary disclosure hobbles the reflexive mechanism by asking 
nothing more of the manager than the underlying substantive rule 
does. This feature of binary disclosure also weakens the vitality of 
the deterrent and enhancement mechanisms. The strength of these 
mechanisms varies with the capacity of the disclosure provision to 
deliver information regarding compliance to the recipient regulator 
or other third party. For deterrence, the knowledge that the regulator 
will possibly take action in response to strategic noncompliance may 
cause the manager to shift her interpretation so as to avoid that 
agency reaction. For enhancement, the regulator actually takes ac-
tion and forces a change in the firm’s behavior. Yet neither can hap-
pen if the disclosure provision allows the good-faith manager to rely 
upon an aggressive reading of the substantive rule in question to 
likewise avoid disclosure.  
 Again the RBS Industries case provides a useful example. The 
NSPS notification provision asks the operations manager whether 
the project is a modification. In performing their analysis of the un-
derlying substantive requirement, Kay Burde and the operations 
manager have already considered that question. They have already 
struggled with the choice among the various potential positions, 
evaluated the magnitude of legal support for each position, and con-
cluded what magnitude of legal support—be it a reasonable basis or 
substantial authority or something else—is called for by the compli-
ance norm and other individual and firm norms. Having done all 
that, they concluded that the NSPS emission control requirements 
could be ignored without violating the compliance norm. 
 That said, there is little more to this story. Both the substantive 
pollution control requirements and the procedural disclosure obliga-
tion are triggered by a modification. Absent any reporting position in 
the disclosure provision itself, requiring a more stringent level of le-
gal support, it is difficult to believe that the firm would interpret 
“modification” differently in deciding whether disclosure is necessary 
than it did in determining whether control devices are required.  
 I say difficult to believe rather than impossible for good reason. 
My analysis assumes that the substantive decision and the disclosure 
decision were made close in time and by the same decisionmakers. If 
we relax those assumptions, there is a greater likelihood that the two 
determinations could vary. For example, the NSPS notification must 
be made shortly before the proposed modification is implemented. 
Other binary disclosure regimes call for periodic compliance reports, 
thus creating the possibility that some intervening event could occur 
between the initial compliance decision and the subsequent reporting 
decision. That intervening event could involve a shift in the relevant 
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judicial or administrative legal authorities relied upon by the man-
ager. Alternatively, a different person could become involved in the 
disclosure decision, bringing with them a different balance of back-
ground, goals, and social and normative influences. Suppose that the 
disclosure decision is made as part of an annual audit performed by a 
compliance unit within the firm or by a third-party auditor. Their in-
centive structure and their organizational goals may cause them to 
implement the compliance norm in a more aggressive manner.  
 My point here is not that binary disclosure can never support the 
deterrent or enhancement mechanisms. Rather, only that on balance, 
there is strong reason to be skeptical of the value of binary disclosure 
as an enforcement tool, even where we believe that the regulated 
firms and individuals are law-abiding actors. In the next Part, I ex-
amine the case for fuzzy disclosure. 
V.   STRATEGIC NONCOMPLIANCE AND FUZZY DISCLOSURE 
 On the other side of the RBS plant, Bill Moogan is still puzzling 
over how to characterize the costs of the underground storage tank 
remediation. The firm has significant ordinary income for the tax 
year and would like to be able to deduct the bulk of the remediation 
costs immediately.162 If the expenses were to be capitalized into the 
cost basis of the land, the firm would capture the tax benefit only 
upon the sale of the land. Because RBS has no intention of selling in 
the foreseeable future, this characterization significantly reduces the 
present value of the deductions. As in the case of binary disclosure, it 
is helpful to analyze Bill’s response to these issues by splitting the 
substantive decision from the disclosure decision. 
A.   The Substantive Decision 
 Drawing the distinction between deductible and capital expendi-
tures is a classic and persistent problem in tax planning, enforce-
ment, and litigation. It has spawned an astonishing amount of statu-
tory and administrative tinkering, judicial tests and policy, and 
scholarly rumination.163 While the underlying tax policy for the dis-
tinction is relatively straightforward, applying the distinction in a 
clear and consistent fashion has proven to be quite challenging.164 
                                                                                                                    
 162. There is little doubt that costs of construction, groundwater extraction, and 
treatment equipment should be capitalized, as they are associated with the creation of an 
asset with a useful life longer than one year. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(a) (as amended in 
1987). 
 163. See generally Byron Pavano, Note, Life in All Its Fullness: A Discussion of Capi-
talization v. Deduction, 39 B.C. L. REV. 253 (1997). 
 164. Sections 162 and 263 are designed to match income in any given taxable period 
with the expenses that generated it to reach an accurate calculation of net income for tax 
purposes. See, e.g., INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 85-86 (1992); Comm’r v. Idaho 
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This is no less so in the context of remediation expenses. Despite sev-
eral judicial decisions and a series of Internal Revenue Service reve-
nue rulings and pronouncements, there is still much room for dis-
agreement over how established tests of deductibility and capitaliza-
tion apply to the wide range of cleanup scenarios.165 
 Generally speaking, under section 263(a)-1 of the Code, business 
expenses that neither increase the value of property materially nor 
appreciably prolong its useful life are immediately deductible as or-
dinary and necessary business expenses.166 Thus, expenditures that 
simply maintain real property (such as a building or land) or restore 
it to its original use could be deducted.167 In the context of environ-
mental cleanups, the relevant test for determining whether clean-up 
costs increase the value of property is to compare the status of the 
land after the cleanup with the status of that land before it was con-
taminated.168 If the cleanup simply restores the land to its original 
condition without putting it to a new use, then the expenditures are 
deductible, so long as no other provisions of the Internal Revenue 
Code require different treatment.169  
 So far, so good. But Bill faces two challenges in constructing 
an argument in favor of deductibility. First, the contamination 
at the RBS plant appears to have occurred before RBS pur-
chased the property. In those circumstances, the IRS contends 
that the baseline for determining the land’s “original condition” 
is the date of acquisition by the taxpayer.170 By comparing the 
original contaminated condition as of the time of acquisition to 
the condition of the land immediately after cleanup, the agency 
concludes that the taxpayer has permanently improved the 
land. Under the treasury regulations defining capital expenses, 
expenditures that permanently improve an asset must be capi-
talized.171 Moreover, two federal courts of appeals have held that 
remediation expenditures similar to RBS Industries’ must be 
capitalized.172 Still, the law on the tax treatment of remediation 
expenditures is far from settled. Bill can rely on general caselaw re-
                                                                                                                    
Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 16 (1974). 
 165. See United Dairy Farmers, Inc. v. United States, 267 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2001); 
Dominion Res., Inc. v. Comm’r, 219 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2000); Norwest Corp. v. Comm’r, 108 
T.C. 265 (1997); Rev. Rul. 04-18, 2004-8 I.R.B. 509; Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35. 
 166. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-1(b) (as amended in 1993). 
 167. One exception to the restoration principle applies if the taxpayer has taken depre-
ciation or depletion allowances with respect to the asset. I.R.C. § 263(a)(2) (2000). 
 168. See Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Comm’r, 39 T.C. 333, 338 (1962), nonacq. on 
other grounds, 1964-2 C.B. 3.; Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35. 
 169. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35. 
 170. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999952075 (August 28, 1999). 
 171. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-1. 
 172. See United Dairy Farmers, Inc. v. United States, 267 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2001); 
Dominion Res., Inc. v. Comm’r, 219 F.3d 359, 359 (4th Cir. 2000). 
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garding rehabilitation of land to dispute the IRS’s position.173 And at 
least one of the appellate court decisions could be distinguished on its 
facts: in that case the taxpayer incurred the clean-up costs for the 
purpose of preparing a former power plant property for use as an of-
fice complex.174 RBS has no plans to so radically convert the land to a 
new use.  
 Second, Bill must also deal with the application of section 263A of 
the Code, which requires that direct costs and indirect costs properly 
allocable to the production of inventory be included in inventory 
costs.175 Thus, for a manufacturing plant like RBS, generally 
deductible business expenses (such as labor costs or interest 
expenses) associated with manufacturing operations must be 
included in the cost of goods sold rather than deducted immediately. 
The problem is that the IRS considers remediation expenses at 
manufacturing facilities to be “incurred by reason of [the taxpayer’s] 
production activities” within the meaning of the section 263A 
regulations, meaning that those expenses must also be included in 
inventory costs.176 Just how bad this is for a taxpayer depends on the 
method of inventory accounting the firm uses. Because RBS 
Industries has adopted FIFO (first-in, first-out) inventory accounting 
and has a fairly large inventory at present, there may be some 
significant delay before the firm captures the tax benefit of the 
expenses.177 The agency’s position on inventory costs is weaker than 
its position on capitalization into the land. The former position is 
based solely on an informal interpretation of the regulations set out 
in a private letter ruling without any supporting caselaw,178 and the 
critical language—“such property’s proper share of those indirect 
costs (including taxes) part or all of which are allocable to such 
property”179—is quite ambiguous. 
 In making his decision about the proper tax treatment of the 
clean-up expenditures, Bill Moogan faces an organizational environ-
ment similar to that facing Kay Burde. The normative drive to com-
ply with the law will run up against competing organizational and 
professional norms that encourage the adoption of aggressive, tax-
                                                                                                                    
 173. See Plainfield-Union Water, 39 T.C. at 333. 
 174. Dominion Res., 219 F.3d at 372. Indeed, the Dominion court declined to use the 
IRS’s post-acquisition-condition/post-cleanup-condition test, relying instead on the notion 
that the taxpayer was able to convert the property to an entirely new use. Id. 
 175. I.R.C. § 263A (2000). 
 176. Rev. Rul. 04-18, 2004-8 I.R.B. 509. 
 177. DECHERT LLP, IRS ISSUES TWO REVENUE RULINGS ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
REMEDIATION (Mar. 2004) (on file with author). 
 178. See Estate of McLendon v. Comm’r, 135 F.3d 1017, 1023-24 (5th Cir. 1998) (stat-
ing that revenue rulings are given less deference than agency’s formally promulgated regu-
lations). 
 179.  I.R.C. § 263A(a)(2)(B). 
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reducing positions. Like Kay, Bill will be influenced by his social 
network and by preconscious motivational and cognitive biases. For 
purposes of this discussion, I assume that this mix of norms, social 
influences, and biases leads Bill to conclude that there is a reason-
able basis for immediate deduction, an aggressive position that the 
agency would view as strategic noncompliance. Yet the existence of a 
reasonable basis allows Bill to take this position without violating 
the compliance norm.  
B.   The Disclosure Decision 
 The tax code establishes at least two disclosure requirements that 
could affect Bill’s ultimate treatment of the costs. The first is the ba-
sic obligation to file an income tax return for the firm. In this con-
text, that filing requirement is essentially binary disclosure; the cor-
porate return asks only for conclusions regarding deductibility and 
does not inquire as to the strength of or legal support for those 
conclusions. However, the separate substantial understatement 
penalty provisions also establish a fuzzy disclosure regime by 
waiving the twenty percent penalty for taxpayers who disclose 
aggressive positions, that is, positions lacking “substantial 
authority.” As I noted above, for purposes of illustration, I am 
treating this as an obligation to report positions that lack substantial 
authority.180 Substantial authority exists where “the weight of the 
authorities that support the taxpayer’s position [is] substantial when 
compared with those supporting other positions.”181 Although Bill 
believes that there is a reasonable basis for deducting the clean-up 
costs, given the recent cases and revenue rulings, he is not convinced 
that there is substantial authority for this position. The remainder of 
this Part considers how the fuzzy disclosure provision could affect 
Bill’s ultimate treatment of the item under these circumstances. As 
with binary disclosure, I examine the potential roles played by the 
reflexive, deterrent, and enhancement mechanisms in minimizing 
the frequency and magnitude of strategic noncompliance. 
1.   Accountability and the Reflexive Mechanism 
 Unlike binary disclosure, fuzzy disclosure challenges the individ-
ual to think more closely about the position taken than would be the 
case absent the disclosure obligation. At the conscious level, the ex-
plicit statement of a heightened baseline reporting standard—in this 
context substantial authority—may cause Bill to be more exacting in 
                                                                                                                    
 180. See supra Part V.A; PENALTY PROVISIONS, supra note 63, at 153 (describing accu-
racy-related substantial understatement penalty waiver provisions as “[s]tandards requir-
ing disclosure of tax return position to IRS”). 
 181. REVENUE PROVISIONS, supra note 92, at 217-18. 
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his evaluation of the legitimacy of the position. Moreover, in addition 
to the higher level of legal support brought to bear by the disclosure 
provision, the economic stakes are higher. Failure to disclose can re-
sult in a significant penalty. Yet, the preconscious impact of fuzzy 
disclosure may be equally or even more important than these con-
scious factors when one considers the potential effect of accountabil-
ity.  
 Psychological research regarding the impact of accountability on 
behavior suggests that fuzzy disclosure could have some meaningful 
bearing on strategic noncompliance. For these purposes, “account-
ability” is defined as the expectation that one may be called upon to 
justify one’s beliefs and actions to others.182 A good-faith actor in 
Bill’s position would very likely experience such an expectation with 
respect to at least two “audiences.” As an initial matter, Bill will pro-
ceed under the assumption that if the firm does in fact deduct the 
costs, it should also explicitly disclose that position to the IRS. While 
the existence of a “reasonable basis” for deductibility ensures that the 
compliance norm will be satisfied, it does not satisfy the more strin-
gent substantial authority standard of the disclosure provision.183 
Thus, Bill anticipates that the IRS will be aware of the firm’s position 
and that he may very well be called upon to justify that position be-
fore the agency. Second, it may be that other senior tax professionals 
or upper-level managers within the firm will evaluate Bill’s 
conclusions regarding both deductibility and disclosure. This second 
audience could have significantly different views than the IRS about 
deductibility. 
 While there has been a significant amount of research regarding 
accountability and decisionmaking,184 little of it has explored the ef-
fects of accountability cross-pressures, that is, the existence of two 
                                                                                                                    
 182. See Tetlock, supra note 57, at 337. Accountability is a multifaceted concept and 
can include effects from the mere presence of observers of action, evaluation by others, and 
the obligation to explain one’s self. Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for 
the Effects of Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 255-56 (1999). 
 183. Bill’s sense that disclosure is necessary could have two grounds. First, from the 
perspective of economic rationality, Bill may feel that the risks of losing on the question of 
deductibility and incurring the large substantial understatement penalty (and other penal-
ties and interest) outweigh the value of the deduction. Second, to the extent that Bill views 
disclosure under the substantial understatement penalty rules as something akin to a le-
gal obligation, the compliance norm would lead him to view disclosure as necessary here, 
where the position is not supported by substantial authority. I recognize that as actually 
drafted, the substantial understatement penalty provisions do not require disclosure; they 
simply reward it in some circumstances. In using fuzzy disclosure in the future, regulators 
may want to be careful to cast it as an obligation rather than a reward in order to leverage 
the power of the compliance norm. 
 184. For helpful and concise summaries of the literature, see Lerner & Tetlock, supra 
note 182; Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability and Political Review of Agency 
Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059 (2001); Tetlock, supra note 57. 
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audiences with known, contradictory views.185 Based on the limited 
work on this issue, we know that Bill may respond to accountability 
cross-pressure by using either of two classes of coping strategies.186 
First, he may engage in decision-avoidance strategies, such as pro-
crastination, passing the buck, or exiting the situation. Those of us 
who have worked in government bureaucracies, business firms, or 
other organizations can probably recount numerous stories of deci-
sion-avoidance strategies in action. In our case, however, some deci-
sion must be made by a certain date about how to treat clean-up ex-
penses. Otherwise, the tax benefit, whatever it may be worth, will be 
lost.187 So I assume that Bill will not avoid the decision of how to 
treat the item for tax purposes. 
 Second, Bill may engage in “high-cognitive-effort attempts to form 
integratively complex positions on the issue at hand.”188 In other 
words, he will devote more cognitive resources to assessing the rela-
tive positions of the audiences and will be more critical of each. 
Moreover, he may attempt to find a compromise position that could 
satisfy both audiences.189 In some or perhaps in many cases involving 
regulatory compliance, the individual may not be able to identify a 
suitable compromise position. For example, it is difficult to see an 
appropriate “middle-of-the-road” interpretation of the tax issue facing 
Bill. Nonetheless, the individual would still potentially engage in 
                                                                                                                    
 185. See Michael Gibbins & James D. Newton, An Empirical Exploration of Complex 
Accountability in Public Accounting, 32 J. ACCT. RES. 165, 168 (1994) (noting that public 
accountants are likely to face multiple sources of accountability); Melanie C. Green et al., 
Coping with Accountability Cross-Pressures: Low-Effort Evasive Tactics and High-Effort 
Quests for Complex Compromises, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1380, 1381 
(2000) (“Research has only begun to explore the role of different . . . audiences in determin-
ing individuals’ responses to accountability pressure.”). Existing research also does not ad-
dress the effects of accountability where the audience and the individual have an adversar-
ial relationship. See id. at 1389.  
 186. In this study, Green, Visser, and Tetlock provided the undergraduate experimen-
tal subjects with materials setting out arguments on both sides of the free trade issue. 
Students in the accountability group were led to believe that they would have to justify 
their views to an audience: in some cases a pro-free trade audience, in other cases an anti-
free trade audience, and in still others a mixed pro- and anti-free trade audience. Green et 
al., supra note 185, at 1382-84. As far as I know, the only other published study of ac-
countability cross-pressures is Gibbins & Newton, supra note 185. In that study, the au-
thors surveyed 156 public accountants regarding their perception of the existence and im-
pact of accountability cross-pressures. 
 187. One can imagine a situation in which a particularly stressful compliance issue 
could be passed from one individual or department to another until it is lost in the bowels 
of the firm. For example, assume that the NSPS notification was structured as fuzzy dis-
closure, and that Kay Burde and others in the firm engaged in decision-avoidance rather 
than taking a stand about NSPS applicability. The issue may become an orphan, and a de-
cision not to install control equipment could be made by default. This is an interesting 
situation in which what begins as a potential instance of strategic noncompliance ulti-
mately morphs into an act of routine noncompliance.  
 188. Green et al., supra note 185, at 1387. 
 189. Id. at 1381. 
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more sophisticated evaluation of the alternative positions than under 
a binary disclosure scenario, and that is precisely what the reflexive 
mechanism seeks. 
 Having said that, I want to raise a couple of cautionary notes here. 
First, each of the coping strategies discussed above is subject to 
boundary conditions.190 For example, in some accountability cross-
pressure situations, the integrative complexity that arises may be 
relatively mindless, in which case the individual tries to find middle 
ground without first discounting weak or specious arguments raised 
by the audiences.191 Second, research on accountability in the 
complex context of the business firm and regulatory environment is 
still quite young. Although the phenomenon of accountability has 
also been observed in field experiments in several industries,192 we 
have yet to see much work on accountability cross-pressures in a 
business environment. Thus, the usual concerns about applying 
experimental results obtained from a population of undergraduate 
students too quickly to the cognitively messy world of the business 
firm certainly apply here.193 Nonetheless, current and future 
accountability research does offer a potentially important source of 
information in evaluating and designing disclosure regimes. 
2.   The Deterrence Mechanism and Fuzzy Disclosure 
 As part of the deterrence mechanism of disclosure, the individual 
anticipates the likely reaction of the information recipient and, where 
appropriate, alters his or her own behavior so as to obviate disclosure 
and thus avoid the expected reaction. Use of a fuzzy disclosure struc-
ture can assist this process in two ways. On the conscious level, it can 
increase the likelihood that the good-faith actor believes that 
disclosure is required. On the preconscious level, it can boost the 
probability that the individual will change his or her position in light 
of the recipient’s reaction. I start with the impacts on the conscious 
level.  If Bill concludes, as Kay Burde did, that no disclosure of the firm’s 
position is required, the engine of the deterrence mechanism will 
slowly spin to a stop. No disclosure means no government or third-
party reaction. If, instead, Bill determines that the law calls for dis-
                                                                                                                    
 190. For example, the individual’s personal need for cognition may moderate the use of 
decision-avoidance strategies. Id. at 1382. 
 191. Id. at 1388 (noting that both forms of integrative complexity have been docu-
mented “but the boundary conditions for their occurrence have yet to be delineated”).  
 192. See David Antonioni, The Effects of Feedback Accountability on Upward Appraisal 
Ratings, 47 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 349, 352-55 (1994) (insurance agents); Patricia M. Fandt 
& Gerald R. Ferris, The Management of Information and Impressions: When Employees 
Behave Opportunistically, 45 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 140, 
142-43 (1990) (customer service representatives); Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 182, at 257 
(surveying the literature).  
 193. See Seidenfeld, supra note 110, at 490. 
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closure, as a good-faith actor he will either disclose or alter his posi-
tion so as to avoid disclosure. The value of fuzzy disclosure lies pri-
marily in its capacity to force the good-faith actor to conservatively 
define compliance for purposes of disclosure. In the RBS case, Bill is 
able to take an aggressive substantive position by defining “compli-
ance” by reference to a fairly liberal standard of legal support, such 
as “reasonable basis.” For purposes of identifying compliance in fuzzy 
disclosure, the regulator requires Bill to measure his position against 
a more exacting standard, such as “substantial authority.” So a posi-
tion that constitutes compliance for purposes of the substantive law 
is characterized as noncompliant with regard to disclosure. The regu-
lator thus takes advantage of the spread between the two standards 
of legal support, bringing the compliance norm to bear on the disclo-
sure question. 
 Assuming Bill therefore concludes that disclosure is required, the 
potential costs flowing from disclosure may lead him to alter his sub-
stantive position on the tax treatment of the clean-up costs. At first 
blush, the downside of disclosure may seem limited, even if it results 
in the IRS disallowing the claimed deduction. By disclosing, Bill pro-
tects himself from substantial understatement penalties,194 limiting 
the economic aftermath of the denied deduction to payment of the tax 
and interest. That all assumes, of course, that the agency actually 
acts upon the disclosure; if not, then RBS will continue to benefit 
from the immediate deduction. However, when he considers the indi-
rect impacts of disclosure, Bill may choose to moderate or even aban-
don the aggressive position. For example, in the event an audit is 
triggered by the disclosure, it will probably not be limited to just the 
remediation expenditures, but instead may encompass all items of 
income and deduction on the return. Beyond the risk of adjustment to 
other return items, the audit itself will generate transaction costs in 
terms of resources expended preparing for the audit and fees paid for 
attorneys or other tax professionals.195   
 Under certain circumstances, accountability pressures at the pre-
conscious level could also cause Bill to reduce the aggressiveness of 
his tax position. Earlier I assumed that Bill was accountable to an in-
ternal audience of firm managers and senior tax professionals, creat-
ing accountability cross-pressures. If, instead, we assume that Bill’s 
tax judgments are accorded significant deference within the firm,196 
he faces only one source of accountability: the IRS. Accountability re-
                                                                                                                    
 194. If he is right about having a reasonable basis for his position, he should also be 
safe from negligence penalties. 
 195. Beck et al., supra note 11, at 245. 
 196. As a tax attorney, Bill has professional expertise which sets him apart from others 
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ulty assure me that this is the case with all tax attorneys! 
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search suggests that when individuals are accountable to an audi-
ence with known views, they exhibit a tendency to conform their own 
views to those of the audience.197 This phenomenon may reflect the 
individual’s desire to avoid the cognitive efforts needed to carefully 
evaluate the audience’s view, as well as the individual’s psychological 
drive to seek approval from the audience.198 I do not mean to suggest 
that Bill’s judgment would be substantially clouded by cognitive lazi-
ness or intellectual pandering, but only that he may exhibit the ten-
dency to give the agency’s position more deference when disclosure is 
in the offing. 
 The effects of accountability are complicated and may be influenced 
by motivational factors just like other cognitive phenomena. The ten-
dency of individuals to skew their position toward that of a known au-
dience is no exception. The extent to which individuals may conform to 
the audience’s view depends upon the individual’s motivational 
goals.199 For example, in recent experimental studies, participants who 
were primed to make accurate, objective judgments displayed signifi-
cantly less conformity than participants who were motivated to “get 
along.”200 Assuming the results of these studies transfer to other types 
of motivational goals, the conformity effect of accountability may be 
moderated or offset in Bill’s case by professional norms of client ser-
vice, by organizational norms encouraging the reduction of costs, or by 
any number of other goals that drive Bill’s behavior. 
 A last note about timing is also in order here. The conformity effect 
discussed above is typically limited to situations of predecisional ac-
countability, meaning cases in which the individual learns of the need 
to justify her actions before she commits herself to a particular deci-
sion. Where the individual becomes aware of accountability pressure 
during the postdecision period, she is more likely to engage in defen-
sive bolstering in which she focuses her cognitive efforts on rationaliz-
ing the decision, rather than critically assessing its merits.201 As I 
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668  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:617 
 
noted above, we should be careful not to rely too quickly on this re-
search in developing disclosure policy. That said, pre- and postdeci-
sional research does underscore the potential influence of the structure 
of disclosure provisions on outcomes. For example, if the pre- and 
postdecision dichotomy turns out to be applicable in the context of 
compliance disclosures, it may warrant a heavier reliance on contem-
poraneous disclosure of violations, rather than periodic disclosure 
(such as annual compliance certifications). By linking the disclosure 
decision with the compliance assessment temporally, regulators could 
avoid the defensive bolstering that might result where someone in the 
firm takes a substantive position one month and that person or an-
other makes the disclosure decision some time much later. 
3.   Enhancement and Fuzzy Disclosure 
 This is perhaps the simplest story to tell. I observed above that 
fuzzy disclosure increases the chances that the good-faith actor will de-
termine that disclosure is required. In that event, Bill will either alter 
his position so as to avoid the disclosure obligation or will divulge the 
relevant information. The deterrent mechanism seeks the former, and 
the enhancement mechanism pursues the latter. When the firm 
chooses disclosure, the enhancement mechanism is set into motion, 
and the next move rests with the regulator or other recipient.202 
VI.   THE LIMITS OF FUZZY DISCLOSURE 
 Although my evaluation of fuzzy disclosure thus far is mixed, it 
does appear that fuzzy disclosure could be a somewhat effective tool 
for dealing with strategic noncompliance. Yet strategic 
noncompliance is a tenacious animal, and it cannot be wrangled so 
easily. While fuzzy disclosure may have advantages over binary 
disclosure, regulators must be careful in designing and implementing 
it. This Part highlights two potential obstacles to the effective use of 
fuzzy disclosure: the inherent ambiguity of fuzzy disclosure and the 
risk of norm-based resistance to expanded disclosure. 
A.   Strategic Noncompliance Squared 
 The irony is that the very thing that makes fuzzy disclosure 
work—the conservative reporting standard (such as “substantial au-
thority”)—may itself be wildly ambiguous. Commentators and practi-
                                                                                                                    
 202. The response of the regulator is beyond the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, it is 
worth noting that the effectiveness of the disclosure mechanism does depend in some 
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the deterrent function of the disclosure regime will be adversely affected.  
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tioners alike have grumbled about the vague, open-ended nature of 
standards such as substantial authority or reasonable possibility.203 
That ambiguity suggests that fuzzy disclosure provisions may be just 
as vulnerable to strategic noncompliance as any other regulation. 
 There is some empirical evidence of this vulnerability. In two ex-
periments, Cuccia and his colleagues investigated whether tax prac-
titioners use the ambiguity of reporting standards to support aggres-
sive reporting positions. In the first experiment, thirty-four experi-
enced tax managers from Big Six accounting firms were asked to re-
view a hypothetical case file, including a comprehensive synopsis of a 
tax issue, a client description, copies of relevant court cases, IRC sec-
tions and regulations, and a fictitious reporting standard. Two differ-
ent client descriptions were used. Some participants received an ag-
gressive, risk-taking yet law-abiding client (aggressive disclosure 
condition), while others received a conservative, risk-neutral, law-
abiding client (conservative disclosure condition).204 Each participant 
was to recommend either an aggressive position (exclusion from in-
come) or conservative position (inclusion of the item in question in 
taxable income) to his or her client. The participants in the two dis-
tinct groups were faced with the identical factual situation, legal au-
thorities, and reporting standard (in this case “reasonable likeli-
hood”). The study found that only nineteen percent of the partici-
pants in the conservative disclosure condition chose the aggressive 
reporting position, while eighty-eight percent of those in the aggres-
sive disclosure condition adopted the aggressive position.205 These re-
sults were statistically significant.206  
 In the second experiment, the researchers sought to understand 
the relative importance of the stringency of the reporting standard on 
the one hand and the strategic drive of the tax professional on the 
other.207 A second set of thirty-one tax managers received materials 
similar to those in the first experiment, with two exceptions. First, all 
participants were subjected to the aggressive disclosure condition 
and thus had equal incentive to act strategically in deciding the tax 
issue. Second, each participant received one of two reporting stan-
dards, each being more stringent than the standard used in the first 
experiment. The results indicated that the participants’ reporting de-
cisions were no less aggressive under the more stringent reporting 
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standards than under the less stringent reasonable-likelihood stan-
dard used in the first experiment.208 The study’s authors concluded 
that the participants were able to maintain their aggressive stance 
even in the face of more stringent reporting standards by shifting 
their strategic focus to the analysis of the evidence.209 
 The fact that fuzzy disclosure may be vulnerable to strategic non-
compliance does not necessarily rob it of all value. As I discussed at 
the outset, most ambiguous regulation has a range of potential inter-
pretations, ranging from the frivolous to reasonable and beyond. 
Even admittedly vague terms can come to have a set of generally ac-
cepted meanings within the relevant practice area, which constrain 
somewhat the interpretations that a good-faith actor will adopt. If 
that is true, then reporting standards such as substantial authority 
may still serve a screening mechanism of sorts. The most aggressive 
good-faith actors will still avoid disclosure by massaging the 
reporting standard or the facts of their case. Less aggressive good-
faith actors will acknowledge the need to disclose and act in 
accordance with that conclusion. In considering whether the limited 
net cast by fuzzy disclosure is a failure, one must ask, “As compared 
to what?” As ambiguous as fuzzy disclosure’s reporting standards 
may be, binary disclosure’s lack of any reporting standards is far 
more troublesome. 
B.   Legitimacy and Fuzzy Disclosure 
 This last point brings us full circle in our discussion of the rela-
tionship between the compliance norm and disclosure. Recall that 
one of my governing assumptions is that the behavior of firm actors 
is strongly influenced by the compliance norm, a social norm that en-
courages obedience to the law.210 This Article has largely focused on 
ways in which regulators can leverage the influence of the compli-
ance norm to boost the power of reflexive, deterrent, and enhance-
ment mechanisms of disclosure. This approach essentially assumes 
that the compliance norm will ensure that the good-faith firm 
manager will abide by the more stringent requirements of fuzzy 
disclosure, thus triggering the three mechanisms of disclosure. But 
there is another possibility: firm managers may question the 
legitimacy of the increasingly complex disclosure requirements and 
no longer feel normatively bound to comply with them. 
 Norms scholars have long emphasized the importance of “legiti-
macy” of the law in the operation of the compliance norm. Tyler and 
others note that most people view obedience to legitimate govern-
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mental authority as an obligation of citizenship.211 In this context, 
government action is legitimate when it is designed and “imple-
mented in accordance with principles of procedural justice.”212 While 
the concept of procedural justice is the subject of continuing debate, 
many norms scholars recognize that representation and ethicality 
are two important components of procedural justice.213 Representa-
tion concerns the extent to which the governed individual or entity 
has been able to present its concerns in a meaningful way to the civil 
authority.214 Ethicality focuses on whether the regulator acted so as 
to make the regulated person or firm feel respected as a valuable 
member of society.215 Where these components are substantially ab-
sent, the legitimacy of the government action, and consequently the 
power of the compliance norm, will be weak.216 
 Much of Tyler’s work and that of other norms scholars focused on 
the compliance of individual citizens with laws unrelated to business 
operations.217 Nonetheless, it appears that the relationship between 
perceived legitimacy of the law and the strength of the compliance 
norm also holds true in the world of business. In their classic study of 
corporate compliance, Kagan and Scholz noted that firm managers, 
interviewed in their study and in other studies, consistently re-
counted stories of “ill-conceived and conflicting regulations; officious 
and poorly trained government inspectors, unreasonable paperwork 
requirements; bureaucratic delay; governmental indifference to the 
disruption or inefficiencies in productive processes caused by literal 
enforcement of regulations.”218 Kagan and Scholz and other scholars 
argue that generally law-abiding corporations may selectively violate 
regulations perceived to be arbitrary or unreasonable.219 
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 Stringent requirements in a fuzzy disclosure provision could trig-
ger concerns regarding representation and ethicality in the minds of 
firm managers. Regulators must understand that from the manager’s 
perspective, the firm is already subject to a raft of disclosure obliga-
tions under state and federal laws. The imposition of a more compli-
cated form of disclosure may be viewed as an offensive intrusion into 
the firm’s internal decisionmaking routines, adding delay and cost to 
operational decisions with little perceived benefit to the regulatory 
program. As such, the fuzzy disclosure could be characterized as yet 
another example of inflexible command-and-control regulation that 
fails to take the firm’s needs into account, and thus reduces the rep-
resentative aspects of the regulation.220 Moreover, the firm may take 
the heightened standard of fuzzy disclosure as a reflection of distrust 
and the apparent disregard of the delays and costs caused by the 
provision as a sign of disrespect. This perspective could undermine 
the perceived ethicality of the fuzzy disclosure program.221 These po-
tential reactions thus raise the possibility that the compliance norm 
could have reduced impact on a given firm’s decision regarding fuzzy 
disclosure.  
 It is difficult to quantify the risk that fuzzy disclosure will lead to 
a breakdown of perceived procedural legitimacy and thus undermine 
the compliance norm. In any given instance, much will depend on the 
past history and current structure of the regulations governing the 
targeted industry, as well as the quality of the relationship between 
the regulator and the regulated sector and its constituent firms. And 
the regulator could perhaps reduce the risk through education and 
meaningful engagement of the relevant industry players in rule 
development and implementation. Nonetheless, the existing 
literature on compliance and norms sets out a strong caution for 
regulators seeking to rely upon the compliance norm in this and 
other contexts.  
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